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## OFF

### 1NC---T

Next off is topicality

#### “On” indicates the object of an action

Brown 18 (BROWN, Judge. Opinion in State ex rel. Montgomery v. Brain, 422 P. 3d 1065 - Ariz: Court of Appeals, 1st Div. 2018. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 8/26/21)

¶ 13 The State asserts that if "on another person" were to modify the first clause of A.R.S. § 13-105(13), then no crime could be charged as a dangerous offense absent "direct contact with another person." But the State construes the word "on" too narrowly, as it can function to identify a variety of situations. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 823-24 (1988) (giving the following definitions of "on": (1) "used... to indicate position in close proximity with ... "; (2) "used ... to indicate the object of collision, opposition, or hostile action ... "; and (3) "used ... to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort "). These varied definitions also defeat the State's arguments that "[o]ne does not discharge nor threateningly exhibit a dangerous instrument `on' a person" and that "a dangerous instrument would be discharged at another person or threateningly exhibited to another person." Given the broad meaning of "on," there is no grammatical inconsistency in the language the legislature used to define a dangerous offense.

#### ‘Anticompetitive’ means reducing competition, in contrast to procompetitive

Texas Supreme Court 15 (Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. IN RE MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSP. SYSTEM, 464 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. 2015). Google Scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/22/21).

Neither section 160.007 nor any other peer review committee privilege that incorporates the phrase "anticompetitive action" defines the term.[43] Black's Law Dictionary defines "anticompetitive" as "[h]aving a tendency to reduce or eliminate competition" in contrast to the term procompetitive.[44] Procompetitive is in turn defined as "[i]ncreasing, encouraging, or preserving competition."[45] Competition itself is defined as "[t]he struggle for commercial advantage; the effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties."[46] The dictionary also notes that the term anticompetitive "describes the type of conduct or circumstances generally targeted by antitrust laws,"[47] although the statement is "not purely definitional."[48]

#### The plan violates—it is a prohibition *on* business practices NOT on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Extra T is a voter

#### A---jurisdiction---extra-topicality is beyond the judge’s scope, and proves the resolution insufficient

#### B---solvency boosters---extra-T steals a core neg argument: that increased competition can’t solve the problems of industry. Debate’s a game of inches, and letting the aff fiat the end to an industry stacks the deck for the aff.

#### In the second half, “Expand” requires an increase or extension of the same use for core antitrust laws

Turpen and Agosta 86 (MICHAEL C. TURPEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA. SUSAN B. AGOSTA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL CHIEF, LEGAL SERVICES. “Opinion No. 85-122” Court:Attorney General of Oklahoma — Opinion, Date published: Feb 27, 1986, <https://casetext.com/case/opinion-no-16187> , date accessed 7/12/21)

"Expand" is defined as "to increase the range, scope, volume, size, etc., of. . . ." New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language (Funk Wagnall, 1982 ed., p. 446). A review of court cases from other jurisdiction offers additional guidance on the meaning of "expand." "Expand" means "an extension of a use or an increase in intensity of the same use." People v. Triem Steel Processing, 125 N.E.2d 678, 679 (Ill.App. 1955). The Illinois Supreme Court has said "expand means to extend, to enlarge." Federal Electric Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1947).

#### The “core” antitrust laws are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Act—from the topic paper

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### The plan violates—antitrust laws were created as an alternative to socialism AND the plan sweeps antitrust laws out of existence

Dewey 64 (Donald Dewey-Associate Professor of Economics, Columbia University. “THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTITRUST: SCIENCE OR RELIGION?” , Virginia Law Review , Apr., 1964, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Apr., 1964), pp. 413-434, accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 10/3/21)

Nevertheless, even if we were able to explain the causes and timing of the corporate revolution, we would still be left with an important and unanswered question. Why did the reaction against laissez faire in the United States produce antitrust while in most European countries it produced strong socialist movements? I think it no accident that following World War II the decline of the socialist tradition in the richer countries of western Europe has been accompanied by a rise of interest in antitrust. If "the commanding heights of industry" are soon to be nationalized and operated as state-owned monopolies, there is no point in worrying about the minor defects of a legal framework that is shortly to be swept away. But if nationalization and state monopoly is not the answer, then the revision of the existing legal framework can be a matter of importance. The reader will be spared another explanation of "why there is no socialism in America." For our purposes, the important aspect of the corporate revolution is the manner in which observers, especially judges, theorized about it after it was largely over. The principal fruit of their reflection was the distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" growth in the corpora- tion. Corporate growth was natural provided that it was not the result of wholesale mergers nor gained by the use of business practices that were unfair. Such tactics could be either ma/a in se (commercial bribery) or objectionable because they were the instrument of a sort of economic terror that discouraged competent rivals from offering competition.

#### Vote neg:

#### Ground---nationalization steals counterplans that eliminate the industry and remove disads based in antitrust like tradeoff.

#### Limits---they lead to a flood of new nationalization affs which stretches the neg too thin

#### Topic education---fiating radical politics beyond the bounds of the resolution is lazy academic planning---they should be forced to find justifications for progressive politics within the confines of antitrust

### 1NC---K

#### Anti-trust is the next step in perfecting American empire---discourses of competition and innovation turn the state into a competitive entity in the global economy, solidifying a state-corporate nexus that cements elite power.

Fougner 6, Associate Professor of International Relations @ Bilkent University (Tore, The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalization: Is There a Future Beyond “The Competition State,” *Review of International Studies*, No. 32, DOI: 10.1017/S0260210506006978)

Neoliberal global governance and international competitiveness

The changes in both the meaning of international competitiveness and the terms of international competitiveness as a governmental problem discussed above can to some extent be seen to follow also from contemporary efforts to govern the world economy in accordance with a neoliberal rationality of government.52 In short, this governmental rationality can be characterised as one within which governance is reflected on with the aid of a vocabulary that includes ‘competition’, ‘market’, ‘freedom’, ‘choice’, ‘customer orientation’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘flexibility’ as core concepts; ‘the market’ is constituted as the ideal in relation to which governance should be oriented; it is accepted that markets can exist only under specific political, legal and institutional conditions that must be actively established by authorities; individual and/or individualised entities are constituted and acted upon as flexible and manipulable subjects with a rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour; the main responsibility for economic activity is ascribed to private market actors; and interventions in such activity on the part of authorities are, if accepted at all, given a theoretical justification based on ideas of market failure or imperfection.

With regard to contemporary reflections and practices on the part of the key international organisations engaged in ‘the management of the global economy’ or ‘global economic policy-making’ (such as the WTO, the IMF, the IBRD and, more indirectly, the OECD), there should be little doubt that a seemingly free and self-regulating global market is constituted as the ideal in relation to which governance should be oriented.53 Moreover, and in spite of the tendency to naturalise or depoliticise the establishment of an open and competitive global marketplace with reference to ‘technological developments’ and ‘market integration’, there is a fairly clear acknowledgement that the realisation of a global marketplace is dependent not only on active state dismantling of barriers to the free flow of goods, services and capital, but also on the putting in place of the basic political, legal and institutional framework in and through which a market is constituted (property rights, contract rights, and so on) and policed on a continuous basis (competition policy).

The acknowledgement of a global marketplace not being self-constitutive is perhaps most evident in the inclusion of ‘competition policy’ on the WTO’s agenda during the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. Its inclusion rests to a very large extent on the recognition that competitive behaviour on the part of firms is not something that follows automatically or naturally from a removal of state barriers to the free flow of goods, services and capital. Rather, and as reflected also in the presence of sizeable competition authorities in all so-called market economies, such behaviour must be not only regulated into being, but also policed on a continuous basis. As noted in a report prepared by WTO’s Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy:

The very rationale for discussing competition policy in the context of the WTO was, in fact, the concern that once government policy-induced restrictions were removed through the implementation by Members of the Uruguay Round commitments, the vacated space might be occupied by private enterprises of an anti-competitive nature.54

While the above implies that states and inter-statal authorities are ascribed a central role in connection with the constitution and policing of a competitive global marketplace, it is explicitly or implicitly given that the responsibility for economic activities as such should rest solely with a private-capitalist business community. In spite of this, however, and despite also what seems to be a growing tendency to conceive of ‘government failure’ as being a greater problem than ‘market failure’, there remains as of today an opening for ‘market interventions’ in accordance with a theoretical argument based on the idea of market failure. As for instance noted by Deputy Managing Director Eduardo Aninat of the IMF, ‘there can be no substitute for supranational efforts to tackle those aspects of globalisation – financial contagion, global warming or marginalisation and social exclusion – that markets can still only imperfectly deal with’.55

In the context of the present article, the important point to note is that the increasingly prominent conception of international competitiveness in terms of ‘attractiveness’ presupposes (re)locational freedom on the part of capital, and that the granting and securing of such freedom is integral to ongoing efforts to govern the world economy according to a neoliberal rationality of government. Although there is currently no comprehensive multilateral framework in place to secure the operational freedom of capital on a planetary scale – an unfortunate result, some might say, of the collapse of the OECD-initiated negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 – FDI-related conditions attached to structural adjustment loans, the steadily growing number of very similar bilateral investment treaties, and the creeping multilateralisation of FDI-related rules within the WTO are de facto bringing the world in that direction.56

International competitiveness and neoliberal governance of states

While efforts to govern the world economy according to a neoliberal rationality of government have contributed to pave the way for the prominent position of ‘attractiveness’ in contemporary reflections on international competitiveness, the contemporary discourse on international competitiveness is central to how states themselves are increasingly subjected to a form of neoliberal governance in the world political economy – this in the sense that they are constituted and acted upon as flexible and manipulable market actors in and through it. In order to place this claim in a broader perspective, a closer look at how the state is constituted as a sovereign, (self)disciplined and competitive entity in connection with contemporary efforts at neoliberal global governance is warranted.

The state as a sovereign entity

Within the context of neoliberal global governance, it can initially be argued that the state is constituted as a sovereign juridico-political entity – this as a consequence of the role that states and/or things inter-statal are ascribed in connection with the constitution and regulation of a global marketplace. The main point here is not that the state is somehow pre- or self-constituted as a sovereign entity, but rather that the entry into intergovernmental regulatory schemes and participation in multilateral organisations make up central elements in the continuous practice in and through which a state is constituted as sovereign vis-à-vis other co-sovereignised states. Moreover, states (as governments) are also presumed to be sovereign vis-à-vis the subjects of the state, since the effectiveness of international regulatory schemes depend on the state’s ability to put them into practice domestically.

The state as a (self)disciplined entity

Beyond its constitution as sovereign, the state is constituted also as a (self)disciplined entity in connection with contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace. In more specific terms, it is thus constituted in relation to both international rules and norms, and globally mobile or footloose capital. The former kind of discipline concerns the constraints that a set of international rules and norms place on the policy options available to state authorities. If the rules and norms in question are considered in relation to intergovernmental agreements, then the constraints follow from a state’s legal obligations under international economic law. In this connection, the actions and policies on the part of state authorities are subjected to continuous surveillance by other parties to the agreements and/or the bodies authorised to oversee them, and disciplinary measures are expected to follow in the case that they break with international law. While there is nothing new in (self)discipline on the part of states in relation to interstate law and agreements, certain developments in the field of international economic law imply both a broadening of constraints and a strengthening of disciplinary enforcement mechanisms.

This is undoubtedly the case with the WTO-agreement of 1994, which has been considered by supporters and critics alike as performing constitutional functions and/or being an incipient global economic constitution.57 While supporters inspired by public choice theory or constitutional economics consider such constitutionalism to serve as a counterbalance to the influence of protectionist or anti-globalist interest groups on state decision-making processes,58 critics like Stephen Gill consider the ‘new constitutionalism’ in question as an essentially undemocratic means through which neoliberal reforms are ‘locked-in’, and state authorities and people in general are handcuffed in relation to a seemingly autonomous economic sphere of reality at the global level.59 Whichever way one wants to see it, the constitutionalism in question is not just any kind of constitutionalism, but a neoliberal one that conceives of a constitution solely as a means to impose limits on state authorities.60

With respect to the second kind of discipline, the issue concerns the constraints that the mobility of capital is claimed to have placed on the policy options available to state authorities. Although this form of discipline is most often portrayed as something involuntary by representatives of state authorities, it should be fairly obvious that it follows more or less automatically from the neoliberal efforts to constitute a global marketplace in general, and to ‘liberate’ the flow and operation of capital and investments in particular. Expressed somewhat differently, once capital is reconstituted at a global level, state authorities can seemingly not do much else but either discipline themselves in relation to, or forcefully be disciplined by, the ‘global logic’ of so-called market forces:

In today’s borderless economy, the workings of the ‘invisible hand’ have a reach and strength beyond anything Adam Smith ever could have imagined. . . . [E]conomic activity is what defines the landscape on which all other institutions, including political institutions, must operate. . . . [T]he often instantaneous movement of people, ideas, information, and capital across borders means that decisions are swayed by the threat that needed resources [or economic activity] will go elsewhere.61

Certain forms of short-term portfolio investments and credit arrangements aside, the ‘quicksilver’ nature often ascribed to contemporary capital and investments is in no way beyond question.62 In spite of this, state authorities can hardly know exactly what it takes for various forms of capital to react negatively and fly or shy away from its territory. With regard to (self)discipline on the part of state authorities, this uncertainty can in itself do the trick: Knowing that the ‘capacity’ on the part of capital to move is there,63 knowing that they and their policies are being scrutinised and surveilled on a continuous basis by a vast array of private-capitalist institutions (firms, banks, credit-rating agencies, political risk analysts, and so on), knowing that each and every ‘wrong’ move on their part will be instantaneously registered and circulated, and thinking and being told that such moves might provoke a negative reaction on the part of capital claimed to be globally footloose – state authorities can easily reach the conclusion that self-restraint is the most feasible policy option.

The state as a competitive entity

Though somewhat more indirectly, the state is constituted also as a competitive entity in connection with contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace. While some might consider this a mere by-product of the state’s constitution as a (self)disciplined entity – this in the sense that the state is left with no option but to compete for capital – the argument made here is that the state is constituted and acted upon as a flexible and manipulable market actor in and through the discourse on international competitiveness. With international competitiveness conceived in terms of ‘attractiveness’, the state is commodified,64 and statesmanship is transformed into salesmanship – not in the old ‘trade mission’ sense of promoting the products and services of ‘national’ firms in external markets, but in the sense of selling the state as a location to globally footloose capital and firms. With ‘selling’ understood in the broad sense of developing, branding, promoting, marketing and selling a product, the state is constituted as a competitor and entrepreneur operating in a global ‘market for investment’.65

According to neoliberal public choice theory, the constitution of states as such competitive and entrepreneurial entities approximates a normative ideal. The reason for this is that what Horst Siebert has called ‘locational competition’66 is often considered ‘a substitute for more overt attempts to contain a government’s Leviathan tendencies such as constitutional amendments’.67 Assuming both that ‘countries can benefit economically from luring factors into their jurisdiction’, and that ‘[i]ndividuals may ‘‘vote by their feet’’ and move either themselves or capital to the most preferred jurisdiction’, state authorities ‘will, driven by their self interest, compete in offering favorable rules and institutions . . . to mobile factors’.68 Although current conditions approximate their normative ideal, public choice theorists can nevertheless be expected to identify the following deficiency in locational competition of the kind discussed above: since competitive behaviour is considered as unnatural for state authorities as it is for firms, ‘[c]ompetition among governments, like competition among firms, cannot be left to itself’:69

Horizontal competition among governments not only requires the removal of barriers to trade, capital movements, and migration and the enforcement of private contracts in inter-state commerce and finance. State governments must not only be prevented from protecting their territorial tax and regulatory monopolies against interjurisdictional substitution by the market. They must also be prevented from setting up tax and regulatory cartels among themselves. Moreover, if horizontal competition is not to be distorted, the competing governments must not be permitted to impose negative non-market externalities – like war, pollution, claim-jumping or cost-raising majority decisions – on each other.70

Although there is currently no federal or supranational authority in place to arrange and police the efficient operation of locational competition among states, there are plenty of actors that work to (re)constitute and act on states as flexible and manipulable market actors on a continuous basis.71 These include IGOs like the OECD, UNCTAD and development banks, whose policy guidelines are often framed in terms of the need of states to compete for footloose capital;72 institutions like the IMD and the WEF, whose competitiveness indices function as benchmarks with respect to the relative ability of states to attract footloose capital;73 scholars from various branches of Business Administration, whose ‘how-to-compete’ knowledge is adapted to and targeted at states-as-competitors;74 consultancy and public relations firms, whose services are promoted vis-à-vis state authorities with reference to their need to compete for footloose capital;75 and individual firms, whose bidding contests or ‘locational tournaments’ in connection with particular investments pit two or more locations against each other.76 Furthermore, and partly in response to the above, state authorities throughout the world have increasingly equipped themselves with national competitiveness councils, national competitiveness reports, investment promotion agencies and so on, in and through which they (re)constitute and act on themselves and their populations as competitive and entrepreneurial ‘place-sellers’ in a global market for investment.77

With regard to state policies and institutions, the shift from aggressiveness to attractiveness in reflections on international competitiveness can be claimed to stimulate both convergence and divergence. On the one hand, locational competition stimulates convergence as state authorities increasingly compare their policies and institutions to those of competitors, and seek to adopt the ‘best practice’ or ‘best offer’ around in order to remain in the locational game. The necessity of being attentive to ‘the needs of the market’ is alpha and omega, and given the policies and institutions considered to be of general importance in attracting capital – security and freedom for capital, a stable and predictable legislative environment, a supportive material and technological infrastructure, a well-educated workforce, and a businessfriendly environment in general (low corporate taxes, flexible labour markets, and so on) – this makes for a certain degree of convergence towards neoliberal state governance.

On the other hand, locational competition also stimulates divergence of a kind, as it becomes of paramount importance for states to stand out as different and better in order to appear attractive in the eyes of capital. In spite of this, however, the option of being different is increasingly constrained as a result of not only the competitive market logic mentioned above, but also how intergovernmental regulatory schemes dig deeper and deeper into what was previously conceived as a ‘domestic’ sphere, and leave less and less space for policies and institutional arrangements that break significantly with the neoliberal norm. Differences do remain, but it is increasingly a question of cosmetic brand-and-packaging differences within the context of the state’s constitution as a dual ‘entrepreneurial state’ – that is, one in which state authorities seek not only to promote entrepreneurship within a ‘national’ space, but also to act entrepreneurially in developing and selling that space as a place-commodity in a global marketplace.78

To round off this discussion on state salesmanship, it should be mentioned that it must to some extent also take residents at large into consideration. The reason for this is not merely that they are part and parcel of the product to be sold, nor that they have the undemocratic privilege to ‘vote with their feet’, but rather that they might rebel and undermine a particular strategy to sell a state. With place-selling being a question not of selling a place with a given identity or product qualities, but rather of the representational and material adaptation of a place to that which is assumed to attract capital, the potential for resistance follows from both how all placeconstructions can be contested and made subject to conflict, and how the reality effects of place-representation and -adaptation are likely to vary among different groups of people.79 Against this background, the ‘economic logic’ through which a place is marketed and sold as something attractive for globally footloose capital must be complemented with a ‘social logic’ through which immobile residents are given a sense of being part of a successful community.80 In this connection, it is somewhat paradoxical to note that the very discourse necessitating such ‘engineering [of] social consensus’81 – that is, the discourse of international competitiveness – seems to have become increasingly central in contemporary processes of identity construction at both state and regional levels.82

Conclusion

The basic idea informing this article has been that the transgression of something that is currently conceived as a given ‘fact of life’ can be facilitated by showing both that what is, has not always been and, in consequence, need not always be in the future; and that what is, is internal not to an unchanging nature, but rather to politics or relations of power. In accordance with this, the article has showed that the problem of international competitiveness has a quite specific history of emergence and transformation internal to state and global forms of governance, and that the discourse of international competitiveness is currently at the centre not only of how state authorities conduct their business, but also how their conduct is shaped and manipulated by other actors in the world political economy.

The broader significance of this (re)problematisation of the problem of international competitiveness lies in its potential contribution to the opening up of a space of possibility for the state to become something other than a competitive entity. In this connection, the issue at stake today is not so much the absence of state conceptions that somehow run counter to the neoliberal one of the state as a competitive entity, as the hegemonic position of the neoliberal problem and discourse of competitiveness as such. If the latter is left unchallenged, as is the case in much of the competition state literature, then alternative state conceptions will unavoidably be assessed in terms of international competitiveness and, in consequence, stand little chance of prevailing in any but distorted and marginal ways.83 Against this background, the historisation and politicisation of the problem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contribute both to make the concept of international competitiveness fall from its current grace, and increase people’s receptivity to both existing and prospective alternatives to the neoliberal conception of the state.

With regard to the prospect of the state becoming something other than a competitve entity, an opening might also follow from how the state has been shown to be constituted as a three-headed troll that is competitive, disciplined and sovereign within the context of contemporary efforts at neoliberal global governance. As sovereign entities, states retain the option to put an end to capital mobility, and thereby both reverse the power relationship that currently characterises their relations with transnational capital, and deny non-state actors the opportunity to act upon and manipulate their conduct at a distance. The key point to note, however, is that the hegemony of neoliberalism as a rationality of government has led states to practice sovereignty in a way that effectively subjects them to such external discipline and governance – this, by engaging in efforts to constitute a global marketplace. Moreover, neoliberal global governance is considered such a precious undertaking today that state authorities have voluntarily, if not proactively, adapted to it by both exercising a high degree of self-discipline, and acting on themselves and their populations as competitors in a global market for investment.

While an understanding of the state as an externally disciplined entity has the potential to stimulate popular opposition and resistance to contemporary forms of neoliberal global governance – in part, because many people simply do not appreciate being forced to do things that they otherwise would not want to do – this understanding seems at present to be much less prevalent in the popular imagination than the one of the state as a competitive entity. Given both the seemingly ahistorical and apolitical nature of the problem of international competitiveness, and how the quest for improved competitiveness can rather easily be represented as part of a positive national project, this situation can be claimed to inhibit the emergence of more broadly-based popular resistance.84 Against this background, the (re)problematisation of the problem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contribute to delegitimise attempts to rally people behind national competitiveness projects, and provide additional stimulus to popular opposition and resistance to contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace.85

In the final analysis, however, the possibility for the state to become something other than a competitive entity is likely to depend also on a more general de-hegemonisation of neoliberalism as a rationality of government. The reason for this is that the constitution and governance of the state as a competitive entity is most properly considered as integral to a more comprehensive process in and through which subjects of various kinds are thus constituted and governed in all spheres and at all levels of social life. As of today, economic logic has so successfully colonised human thought and conduct that it seems unlikely that decolonisation related to states and interstate relations can be achieved if the logic as such continues to reign almost supreme in social life more generally. Considered in this broader context, the present article makes but a modest contribution to more comprehensive efforts aimed at enabling individuals and collectivities alike to break free from an increasingly imperialistic neoliberal governmentality.

#### Modern socialism has lost the ongoing struggle – a return to the roots of Marxism is necessary

Foster 2020, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy, 09-2020, “The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 72 (4): 1–13. doi:10.14452/MR-072-04-2020-08\_1.)

The Polarization of the Class System

In the United States, key sectors of monopoly-finance capital have now succeeded in mobilizing elements of the primarily white lower-middle class in the form of a nationalist, racist, misogynist ideology. The result is a nascent neofascist political-class formation, capitalizing on the long history of structural racism arising out of the legacies of slavery, settler colonialism, and global militarism/imperialism. This burgeoning neofas- cism’s relation to the already existing neoliberal political formation is that of “enemy brothers” characterized by a fierce jockeying for power coupled with a common repression of the working class.’ It is these con- ditions that have formed the basis of the rise of the New York real-estate ‘mogul and billionaire Donald Trump as the leader of the so-called radical right, leading to the imposition of right-wing policies and a new authori- tarian capitalist regime. Even if the neoliberal faction of the ruling class ‘wins out in the coming presidential election, ousting ‘Trump and replac- ing him with Joe Biden, a neoliberal-neofascist alliance, reflecting the internal necessity of the capitalist class, will likely continue to form the basis of state power under monopoly-finance capital.

‘Appearing simultaneously with this new reactionary political forma- tion in the United States is a resurgent movement for socialism, based in the working-class majority and dissident intellectuals. The demise of U.S. hegemony within the world economy, accelerated by the globalization of production, has undermined the former, imperial-based labor aristocracy among certain privileged sections of the working class, leading to a re- surgence of socialism.? Confronted with what Michael D. Yates has called “the Great Inequality,” the mass of the population in the United States, particularly youth, are faced with rapidly diminishing prospects, finding themselves in a state of uncertainty and often despair, marked by a dra- matic increase in “deaths of despair.” They are increasingly alienated from a capitalist system that offers them no hope and are attracted to socialism as the only genuine alternative." Although the US situation is unique, similar objective forces propelling a resurgence of socialist move- ments are occurring elsewhere in the system, primarily in the Global South, in an era of continuing economic stagnation, financialization, and universal ecological decline. But if socialism is seemingly on the rise again in the context of the structural crisis of capital and increased class polarization, the ques- tion is: What kind of socialism? In what ways does socialism for the twenty-first century differ from socialism of the twentieth century? Much of what is being referred to as socialism in the United States and elsewhere is of the social-democratic variety, seeking an alliance with left-liberals and thus the existing order, in a vain attempt to make capitalism work better through the promotion of social regulation and social welfare in direct opposition to neoliberalism, but at a time when neoliberalism is itself giving way to neofascism. Such movements are bound to fail at the outset in the present historical context, inevitably betraying the hopes that they unleashed, since focused on mere elec- toral democracy. Fortunately, we are also seeing the growth today of a genuine socialism, evident in extra-electoral struggle, heightened mass action, and the call to go beyond the parameters of the present system, so as to reconstitute society as whole.

‘The general unrest latent at the base of US. society was manifested in the uprisings in late May and June of this year, which took the form, practically unheard of in US. history since the US. Civil War, of massive solidarity protests with millions of people in the streets, and with the white working class, and white youth in particular, crossing the color line en ‘masse in response to the police lynching of George Floyd for no other crime than being a Black man. This event, coming in the midst of the COVID-9 pandemic and the related economic depression, led to the June days of rage in the United States.

But while the movement toward socialism, now taking hold even in the United States at the “barbaric heart” of the system, is gaining ground as a result of objective forces, it lacks an adequate subjective basis. A major obstacle in formulating strategic goals of socialism in the world today has to do with twentieth-century socialism’s abandonment of its own ideals as originally articulated in Karl Marx’s vision of communism. ‘To understand this problem, it is necessary to go beyond recent left at- tempts to address the meaning of communism on a philosophical basis, a question that has led in the last decade to abstract treatments of The Com- ‘munist Idea, The Communist Hypothesis, and The Communist Horizon by Alain Badiou and others“ Rather, a more concrete historically based starting point is necessary, focusing directly on the two-phase theory of socialist) communist development that emerged out of Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme and V. I. Lenin’s The State and Revolution. Paul M. Sweezy’s arti- cle “Communism as an Ideal,” published more than half a century ago in ‘Monthly Review in October 1963, is now a classic text in this regard."

Marx's Communism as the Socialist Ideal

In The Critique of the Gotha Programme —written in opposition to the econ- omistic and laborist notions of the branch of German Social Democracy in- fluenced by Ferdinand Lassalle— Marx designated two historical “phases” in the struggle to create a society of associated producers. The first phase ‘was initiated by the “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,” reflect- ing the class-war experience of the Paris Commune and representing a period of workers’ democracy, but one that still carried the “defects” of capitalist class society. In this initial phase, not only would a break with capitalist private property take place, but also a break with the capitalist state as the political command structure of capitalism.” As a measure of the limited nature of socialist transition in this stage, production and dis- tribution would inevitably take the form of to each according to one’s labor, perpetuating conditions of inequality even while creating the conditions for their transcendence. In contrast, in the later phase, the principle gov- erning society would shift to from each according to one’s ability, to each accord- ‘ng to one’s need and the elimination of the wage system.” Likewise, while the initial phase of socialism/communism would require the formation of a new political command structure in the revolutionary period, the goal in the higher phase was the withering away of the state as a separate appara- tus standing above and in antagonistic relation to society, to be replaced ‘with a form of political organization that Frederick Engels referred to as “community,” associated with a communally based form of production.”

In the later, higher phase of the transition of socialism/communism, not only would property be collectively owned and controlled, but the consti- tutive cells of society would be reconstituted on a communal basis and production would be in the hands of the associated producers. In these conditions, Marx stated, “labor” will have become not a mere “means of life” but “itself...the prime necessity of life.’\*® Production would be di- rected at use values rather than exchange values, in line with a society in which “the free development of each” would be “the condition for the free development of all.” The abolition of capitalist class society and the creation of a society of associated producers would lead to the end of class exploitation, along with the elimination of the divisions between men- tal and manual labor and between town and country. The monogamous, patriarchal family based on the domestic enslavement of women would also be surmounted. Fundamental to Marx’s picture of the higher phase of the society of associated producers was a new social metabolism of hu- manity and the earth. In his most general statement on the material con- ditions governing the new society, he wrote: “Freedom, in this sphere [the realm of natural necessity], can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism of nature in a rational way...accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy” in the process of promoting conditions of sustainable human development.

‘Writing in The State and Revolution and elsewhere, Lenin deftly captured Marx’s arguments on the lower and higher phases, depicting these as the first and second phases of communism. Lenin went on to emphasize what he called “the scientific distinction between socialism and commu- nism,” whereby “what is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the ‘first,’ or lower phase of communist society,” whereas the term com- ‘munism, meaning “complete communism,” was most appropriately used for the higher phase. Although Lenin closely aligned this distinction with Marx’s analysis, in later official Marxism this came to be rigidified in terms of two entirely separate stages, with the so-called communist stage so removed from the stage of socialism that it became utopianized, no longer seen as part of a continuous or ongoing struggle. Based on a ‘wooden conception of the socialist stage and the intermediary principle of distribution to each according to one’s labor, Joseph Stalin carried out an ideological war against the ideal of real equality, which he character- ized as a “reactionary, petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics but not of a socialist society organized on Marxist lines.” ‘This same stance was to persist in the Soviet Union in one way or another all the way to Mikhail Gorbachev.\*

Hence, as explained by Michael Lebowitz in The Socialist Imperative, “rather than a continuous struggle to go beyond what Marx called the ‘defects’ inherited from capitalist society, the standard interpretation” of Marxism in the half-century from the late 1930s to the late ’80s “intro- duced a division of post-capitalist society into two distinct ‘stages,” de- termined economistically by the level of development of the productive forces. Fundamental changes in social relations emphasized by Marx as the very essence of the socialist path were abandoned in the process of living with and adapting to the defects carried over from capitalist soci- ety. Instead, Marx had insisted on a project aimed at building the com- munity of associated producers “from the outset” as part of an ongoing, if necessarily uneven, process of socialist construction.”\*

‘This abandonment of the socialist ideal associated with Marx’s higher phase of communism was wrapped up in a complex way with changing ‘material (and class) conditions and eventually the demise of Soviet-type societies, which tended to stagnate once they ceased to be revolutionary and even resurrected class forms, heralding their eventual collapse as the new class or nomenklatura abandoned the system. As Sweezy argued in 1971, “state ownership and planning are not enough to define a viable social- ism, one immune to the threat of retrogression and capable of moving forward on the second leg of the movement to communism.” Something more was needed: the continuous struggle to create a society of equals.

For Marx, the movement toward a society of associated producers was the very essence of the socialist path embedded in “communist con- sciousness.”” Yet, once socialism came to be defined in more restrictive, economistic terms, particularly in the Soviet Union from the late 1930s onward, in which substantial inequality was defended, post-revolution- ary society lost the vital connection to the dual struggle for freedom and necessity, and hence became disconnected from the long-term goals of socialism from which it had formerly derived its meaning and coherence.

Based on this experience, it is evident that the only way to build so- cialism in the twenty-first century is to embrace precisely those aspects of the socialist/communist ideal that allow a theory and practice radical enough to address the urgent needs of the present, while also not los-ing sight of the needs of the future. If the planetary ecological crisis has taught us anything, it is that what is required is a new social metabo- lism with the earth, a society of ecological sustainability and substantive equality. This can be seen in the extraordinary achievements of Cuban ecology, as recently shown by Mauricio Betancourt in “The Effect of Cu- ban Agroecology in Mitigating the Metabolic Rift” in Global Environmental Change. This conforms to what Georg Lukacs called the necessary “dou- ble transformation” of human social relations and the human relations to nature Such an emancipatory project must necessarily pass through various revolutionary phases, which cannot be predicted in advance. Yet, to be successful, a revolution must seek to make itself irreversible through the promotion of an organic system directed at genuine human needs, rooted in substantive equality and the rational regulation of the human social metabolism with nature.

#### The aff's assumption that capitalism "militarizes" foreign policy is a palliative for colonial violence - war is inherently constitutive of foreign policy. Their approach to politics assumes a peaceful order has been breached by militarism when in fact PMCs are not an aberration from the liberal order but part of an anti-Black lineage, colonial lineage.

Howell 18 (Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science @ Rutgers University and affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies + the Division of Global Affairs + Global Urban Studies, “ Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 117-136, April 5) arnav

There is something seemingly intuitive about the concept of “militarization.” Current events seem to consistently point to some new domain of civilian life being overtaken by military values, technologies or aesthetics. Indeed the concept of militarization circulates not only in feminist thought and wider academic discourse, but in public discourse too. Not only does it seem to reflect a common sense truth – it is also potentially politically expedient to invoke “militarization.” By claiming that something has been recently militarized, it becomes possible to call for demilitarization, the arrest or reversal of this apparent introduction of military funding, technologies or cultures into “civilian” domains. The concept of militarization seems attractive in part because it holds out the possibility of emancipation from military encroachment into civilian life, but what if there was no such “pure” civilian political space to begin with?

This article argues that the concept of militarization obscures the constitutive nature of war-like relations of force perpetrated against populations deemed to be a threat to civil order or the health of the population, especially along lines of race, Indigeneity, disability, gender, sexuality and class. Embedded in “militarization” is a theorization of “before and after” – of movement from a non-militarized (or less-militarized) state to a militarized one. This erroneously assumes there ever was a peaceful domain of “normal” or “civilian” politics unsullied by military intrusion: a false and dangerous assumption that lulls us into faith in the naturally peaceful nature of “normal” politics. This article challenges the concept of militarization through a feminist, anti-racist and disability analysis that focuses on the politics of the police and the university – two institutions that have ostensibly been “militarized.”

As a novel alternative, the article offers the concept of “martial politics.” Here, “martial” signals a need to be attentive to war-like relations or technologies and knowledges that are “of war.” Attaching the word “martial” to “politics” aids in assessing the indivisibility of war and peace, military and civilian, and national and social security. “Martial politics” moves beyond the idea that “militarization” is a new process by which the exception (war) encroaches on the norm (peace). “Normal politics” is not overtaken by “militarization”; instead, martial relations inhere in liberal politics as they are enacted on those who are racialized, Indigenous, disabled, queer or otherwise constituted as a threat to civil order.

The article proceeds in three sections. The first sets out the problems with “militarization” and the potential of “martial politics.” The following two sections explore sites of apparent “militarization” – the police and the university – demonstrating the limits of the “militarization” concept empirically. The article concludes by discussing opportunities for scholarly and political action that are created by dispensing with the expediency of “militarization” in favor of “martial politics.”

From “militarization” to “martial politics”

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope.

Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process:

In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2)

In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics.

Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social

landscape.”

In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations.

As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them.

Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003).

In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (Richter- Montpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight.

#### Specifically, the aff's claim that socialism would solve imperialism replicates the domestic narrative of policing that the cops have too many guns. You should understand the aff as a rearrangement of the US state's war-like relations with slaves and colonial subjects abroad.

Howell 18 (Alison, Associate Professor of Political Science @ Rutgers University and affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies + the Division of Global Affairs + Global Urban Studies, “ Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 117-136, April 5) arnav

The ACLU report provides excellent reporting on the changing tactics, training methods and uses of technology of contemporary US police forces. Following the before-and-after logic of “militarization,” the report identifies the origin point of the problem as the 1980s, drawing our attention to the racial inequities of the War on Drugs, and the increasing post-9/11 use of SWAT teams to conduct search warrants. It exposes federal government programs that have transferred military equipment to police forces, including bomb suits, drones, facial recognition technology, armored vehicles and personal protective armor. Finally, it examines the training of police officers into a “warrior mentality.”

Much of this research is valuable, but the report relies throughout on two false assumptions: first, that if police forces are militaristic, this is an aberration that can be dated to the 1980s, and thus that there is a latent, more positive form of policing to which we can retreat; second, and relatedly, that the raison d’être of American police forces is itself not worthy of questioning. The critical point is not that “war comes home” as the title of the report would have it: war has always been at home in America. The concept of “martial politics” can capture what the “militarization” framework elides: the historical context out of which the use of MRAPs against Black activism develops.

To claim an origin point for “militarization” in the 1980s is to ignore the ways that warfare against Indigenous people and chattel slavery were foundational to the American criminal justice system (Grenier 2008; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Davis 2003). As Black studies scholars and anti-racist activists have illustrated, American law and practices of policing can be traced from slave patrols and Indian War militias, through the Jim Crow era, to contemporary mass incarceration (Davis 2002, 2003; Muhammad 2010; Alexander 2010; Hinton 2016). Disability scholars and activists have drawn out a parallel history of disability incarceration (Ben-Moshe, Chapman, and Carey 2014; Erevelles 2014). For instance, psychiatric incarceration has moved from a system of forced institutionalization to one of compulsory chemical incarceration through enforced medicating in community treatment orders (Fabris 2011). Just as emancipation from slavery gave way to renewed forms of racism perpetrated through law, so has deinstitutionalization given way to renewed forms of ableism perpetrated through medicine and law. These are not separate processes: policing systemically criminalizes racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people (Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock 2011, 45–68; Amar 2013, 73–78, 209–210; Steele 2016, 331, 340–341).

Understanding this history requires acknowledgement that police are not a natural fact. Organized police forces are relatively recent inventions, developing especially in the nineteenth century. They emerged as (and remain) a means of imposing social order. Their precise nature differs in important ways across national contexts and forms of government, depending on which populations were perceived to be threats to social order. For example, British police were formed to quell Irish nationalism and Chartist demonstrations in the interests of wealthy Victorians, fearful that London was growing rapidly in size and impoverishment. The London Metropolitan Police was modelled both on the Bow Street Runners, originators of the concept of regular uniformed police patrols, and on the London Marine Police Force, initially funded by the West India Merchants and the West India Planters Committee for the purposes of securing cargo from the colonies. Techniques of policing were also derived from colonial governance (Brogden 1987). Through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British police forces increasingly took on the role of ensuring public order against the threat of rioting (Harris 2004). In nineteenth-century Canada and Australia, national “mounted” police forces were established to control Indigenous populations, serving as security forces for settler colonialism (Nettelbeck and Smandych 2010; Monaghan 2013).

These histories are important for understanding not only the criminalization of Indigeneity (Ross 1998), and the continued regularity of the murder of Indigenous people in police custody (Razack 2015), but also the ways that war and police have been inextricably entwined for centuries (Bachman, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014). Policing is not a matter of “domestic” politics that can be shuttered from IR inquiry: it is precisely a matter of martial politics, of war-like relations within so-called “domestic” and “international” politics alike.

Likewise, in the US, describing police as “militarized” ignores that the establishment of police forces was tied directly to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and in particular the institution of slave patrols. While in northern US cities like Boston and New York, as in London, policing developed mainly as a means for the social control of the poor and immigrants, in the US south, it emerged precisely as a means for ensuring White social and economic order in relation to (freed) slaves – dynamics that migrated northward alongside those same freed slaves.

In the antebellum South, Blacks outnumbered Whites, and slave-owners lived in fear not only of slave rebellions, but also of the enticement of slaves to join opposing Spanish forces (Hadden 2001). First germinated in the colonial Caribbean, slave patrols were created in the early eighteenth century to enforce slave law (a separate code of law governing slaves). Intended to replace the system of private bounties, slave patrols complemented militias that protected colonists from “external” threats (Indigenous and Spanish). The idea that policing is different from warfare (and requires different forces) is based on the positioning of threats as either internal (slaves) or external (“Indians” and Spanish), but both served the same purpose: securing a White supremacist social and economic order. To this end, slave patrols not only tracked down runaways, but also broke up slave meetings to quash rebellions. They were officially appointed and indemnified by courts of law, operating not only in rural areas but also in cities (Hadden 2001). After the Civil War, and the official abandonment of the slavery system, police forces filled the role previously played by slave patrols (Reichel 1988; Hadden 2001; Davis 2003).

While the American Civil War is traditionally cast as a victory for emancipation, the Jim Crow system of local and state laws soon arose to enforce racial segregation and ensure inequality in everything from housing to public transportation, education and voting rights. Vagrancy laws punishing unemployment were selectively applied, criminalizing freed slaves but not unemployed Whites, resulting in the imprisonment of African Americans who were then put to hard labor – reproducing White supremacism through criminal law (Davis 2003; Alexander 2010). This state of affairs was produced not just by the apparatus of the state. For example, scientific thought also supported White supremacy by creating bogus “proof” of the propensity for criminality in African Americans (Muhammad 2010, 2).

The mid-twentieth century Civil Rights era, like the Civil War before it, is often cast as a triumph of liberal emancipation from Jim Crow – but just as slavery gave way to Jim Crow, segregation gave way to new forms of racist civil order. Much as slave owners feared Black organizing in the antebellum South, so did White urbanites in the Civil Rights era. So-called “riots” in Birmingham, Newark, Detroit and other cities – uprisings against police brutality and inequality – as well as organized resistance movements like the Black Panthers became a “problem” of social order like the slave rebellions of a prior period. The relationship between the military and the police is perhaps clearest in the subjugation of Black organizing in this period: not only was the National Guard called in to “restore order” in Watts, Newark and elsewhere (much as it has recently been activated in Ferguson), but the FBI also created its own counterinsurgency campaign, COINTELPRO, which surveilled, infiltrated and disrupted anti-war and Black power organizations (Browne 2015). This illustrates the martial nature of political formations aimed at suppressing anti-racist activism, from slave patrols through COINTELPRO.

The War on Drugs was then-President Richard Nixon’s own innovation for quashing Black resistance in the name of “law and order.” The ongoing War on Drugs involves strict penalties for drug crimes, which are enforced and punished disproportionately in Black communities. It produced the mass conviction of African Americans, leading not only to imprisonment and forced labor, but also to a substantial diminishment of rights including access to employment, education and voting through the status of so many African Americans as felons (Provine 2007). If the War on Drugs has failed in its stated aim of reducing the drug trade, it has succeeded in enforcing a new racial order based on mass incarceration.

A lineage persists here: police forces, whether antebellum slave patrols, or enforcers of Jim Crow segregation or the War on Drugs, have been central to a form of “martial politics” waged for the purposes of maintaining renewed forms of White social and economic order. Contemporary policing and mass incarceration can thus best be understood not in terms of “militarization,” as the ACLU and others suggest, but as a new expression of the “martial politics” of policing. Through an analysis grounded in “martial politics” we can grasp the presence of military vehicles and uniforms in Ferguson as a matter of continuity in the US state’s war-like relations with slaves and their descendants. This does not mean that modern policing is entirely the same as, for instance, slave patrols. Racism is highly adaptable (Bonilla-Silva 2006). “Martial politics” denotes a continuous framework of war-like relations with people of color, and allows for tracing different systems of racism within it.

It is not that “war” happens elsewhere and is then brought home through “militarization.” This idea relies on a false distinction between what kinds of politics happen at “home” versus in “war.” It positions “domestic” violence as an aberration or inward leakiness of war. On the contrary, like the can of soup, policing does not merely now contain obvious military symbols – it is always already “of war” and war-like in its very form. Policing cannot be said to have been “militarized,” but rather forms part of a broader “martial politics” directed against racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people with the aim of reproducing liberal order.

#### American exceptionalism outweighs and turns case---the U.S. is the greatest threat to peace globally.

Street 18, PhD in History from Binghamton University (Paul, February 20th, “The World Will Not Mourn the Decline of U.S. Hegemony,” *Truth Dig*, <https://www.truthdig.com/articles/world-will-not-mourn-decline-u-s-hegemony/>, Accessed 11-26-2021)

For the purposes of this report, I’ll leave aside the matter of whether Trump is, in fact, speeding the decline of US global power (he undoubtedly is) and how he’s doing that to focus instead on a very different question: What would be so awful about the end of “the American Era”—the seven-plus decades of US global economic and related military supremacy between 1945 and the present? Why should the world mourn the “premature” end of the “American Century”?

It would be interesting to see a reliable opinion poll on how the politically cognizant portion of the 94 percent of humanity that lives outside the US would feel about the end of US global dominance. My guess is that Uncle Sam’s weakening would be just fine with most Earth residents who pay attention to world events.

According to a global survey of 66,000 people conducted across 68 countries by the Worldwide Independent Network of Market Research (WINMR) and Gallup International at the end of 2013, Earth’s people see the United States as the leading threat to peace on the planet. The US was voted top threat by a wide margin.

There is nothing surprising about that vote for anyone who honestly examines the history of “US foreign affairs,” to use a common elite euphemism for American imperialism. Still, by far and away world history’s most extensive empire, the US has at least 800 military bases spread across more than 80 foreign countries and “troops or other military personnel in about 160 foreign countries and territories.” The US accounts for more than 40 percent of the planet’s military spending and has more than 5,500 strategic nuclear weapons, enough to blow the world up 5 to 50 times over. Last year it increased its “defense” (military empire) spending, which was already three times higher than China’s, and nine times higher than Russia’s.

Think it’s all in place to ensure peace and democracy the world over, in accord with the standard boilerplate rhetoric of US presidents, diplomats and senators?

Do you know any other good jokes?

A Pentagon study released last summer laments the emergence of a planet on which the US no longer controls events. Titled At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primary World, the study warns that competing powers “seek a new distribution of power and authority commensurate with their emergence as legitimate rivals to US dominance” in an increasingly multipolar world. China, Russia and smaller players like Iran and North Korea have dared to “engage,” the Pentagon study reports, “in a deliberate program to demonstrate the limits of US authority, reach influence and impact.” What chutzpah! This is a problem, the report argues, because the endangered US-managed world order was “favorable” to the interests of US and allied US states and US-based transnational corporations.

Any serious efforts to redesign the international status quo so that it favors any other states or people is portrayed in the report as a threat to US interests. To prevent any terrible drifts of the world system away from US control, the report argues, the US and its imperial partners (chiefly its European NATO partners) must maintain and expand “unimpeded access to the air, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum in order to underwrite their security and prosperity.” The report recommends a significant expansion of US military power. The US must maintain “military advantage” over all other states and actors to “preserve maximum freedom of action” and thereby “allow US decision-makers the opportunity to dictate or hold significant sway over outcomes in international disputes,” with the “implied promise of unacceptable consequences” for those who defy US wishes.

“America First” is an understatement here. The underlying premise is that Uncle Sam owns the world and reserves the right to bomb the hell out of anyone who doesn’t agree with that (to quote President George H.W. Bush after the first Gulf War in 1991: “What we say goes.”

It’s nothing new. From the start, the “American Century” had nothing to do with advancing democracy. As numerous key US planning documents reveal over and over, the goal of that policy was to maintain and, if necessary, install governments that “favor[ed] private investment of domestic and foreign capital, production for export, and the right to bring profits out of the country,” according to Noam Chomsky. Given the United States’ remarkable possession of half the world’s capital after World War II, Washington elites had no doubt that US investors and corporations would profit the most. Internally, the basic selfish national and imperial objectives were openly and candidly discussed. As the “liberal” and “dovish” imperialist, top State Department planner, and key Cold War architect George F. Kennan explained in Policy Planning Study 23, a critical 1948 document:

We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. … In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. … To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. … We should cease to talk about vague and … unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

The harsh necessity of abandoning “human rights” and other “sentimental” and “unreal objectives” was especially pressing in the global South, what used to be known as the Third World. Washington assigned the vast “undeveloped” periphery of the world capitalist system—Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the energy-rich and thus strategically hyper-significant Middle East—a less than flattering role. It was to “fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials and a market” (actual State Department language) for the great industrial (capitalist) nations (excluding socialist Russia and its satellites, and notwithstanding the recent epic racist-fascist rampages of industrial Germany and Japan). It was to be exploited both for the benefit of US corporations/investors and for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan as prosperous US trading and investment partners organized on capitalist principles and hostile to the Soviet bloc.

“Democracy” was fine as a slogan and benevolent, idealistic-sounding mission statement when it came to marketing this imperialist US policy at home and abroad. Since most people in the “third” or “developing” world had no interest in neocolonial subordination to the rich nations and subscribed to what US intelligence officials considered the heretical “idea that government has direct responsibility for the welfare of its people” (what US planners called “communism”), Washington’s real-life commitment to popular governance abroad was strictly qualified, to say the least. “Democracy” was suitable to the US as long as its outcomes comported with the interests of US investors/corporations and related US geopolitical objectives. It had to be abandoned, undermined and/or crushed when it threatened those investors/corporations and the broader imperatives of business rule to any significant degree. As President Richard Nixon’s coldblooded national security adviser Henry Kissinger explained in June 1970, three years before the US sponsored a bloody fascist coup that overthrew Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.”

The US-sponsored coup government that murdered Allende would kill tens of thousands of real and alleged leftists with Washington’s approval. The Yankee superpower sent some of its leading neoliberal economists and policy advisers to help the blood-soaked Pinochet regime turn Chile into a “free market” model and to help Chile write capitalist oligarchy into its national constitution.

“Since 1945, by deed and by example,” the great Australian author, commentator and filmmaker John Pilger wrote nearly nine years ago: “The US has overthrown 50 governments, including democracies, crushed some 30 liberation movements and supported tyrannies from Egypt to Guatemala (see William Blum’s histories). Bombing is apple pie.” Along the way, Washington has crassly interfered in elections in dozens of “sovereign” nations, something curious to note in light of current liberal US outrage over real or alleged Russian interference in “our” supposedly democratic electoral process in 2016. Uncle Sam also has bombed civilians in 30 countries, attempted to assassinate foreign leaders and deployed chemical and biological weapons.

If we “consider only Latin America since the 1950s,” writes the sociologist Howard Waitzkin:

[T]he United States has used direct military invasion or has supported military coups to overthrow elected governments in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Haiti, Grenada, and Panama. In addition, the United States has intervened with military action to suppress revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. More recently … the United States has spent tax dollars to finance and help organize opposition groups and media in Honduras, Paraguay, and Brazil, leading to congressional impeachments of democratically elected presidents. Hillary Clinton presided over these efforts as Secretary of State in the Obama administration, which pursued the same pattern of destabilization in Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia.

The death count resulting from “American Era” US foreign policy runs well into the many millions, including possibly as many as 5 million Indochinese killed by Uncle Sam and his agents and allies between 1962 and 1975. The flat-out barbarism of the American war on Vietnam is widely documented on record. The infamous My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968, when US Army soldiers slaughtered more than 350 unarmed civilians—including terrified women holding babies in their arms—in South Vietnam was no isolated incident in the US “crucifixion of Southeast Asia” (Noam Chomsky’s phrase at the time). US Army Col. Oran Henderson, who was charged with covering up the massacre, candidly told reporters that “every unit of brigade size has its My Lai hidden somewhere.”

It is difficult, sometimes, to wrap one’s mind around the extent of the savagery Uncle Sam has unleashed on the world to advance and maintain its global supremacy. In the early 1950s, the Harry Truman administration responded to an early challenge to US power in Northern Korea with a practically genocidal three-year bombing campaign that was described in soul-numbing terms by the Washington Post years ago:

The bombing was long, leisurely and merciless, even by the assessment of America’s own leaders. ‘Over a period of three years or so, we killed off—what—20 percent of the population,’ Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command during the Korean War, told the Office of Air Force History in 1984. Dean Rusk, a supporter of the war and later Secretary of State, said the United States bombed ‘everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another.’ After running low on urban targets, US bombers destroyed hydroelectric and irrigation dams in the later stages of the war, flooding farmland and destroying crops … [T]he US dropped 635,000 tons of explosives on North Korea, including 32,557 tons of napalm, an incendiary liquid that can clear forested areas and cause devastating burns to human skin.

Gee, why does North Korea fear and hate Uncle Sam?

This ferocious bombardment, which killed 2 million or more civilians, began five years after Truman arch-criminally and unnecessarily ordered the atom bombing of hundreds of thousands pf civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to warn the Soviet Union to stay out of Japan and Western Europe.

Some benevolent “world policeman.”

The ferocity of US foreign policy in “America Era” did not always require direct US military intervention. Take Indonesia and Chile, for two examples from the “Golden Age” height of the “American Century.” In Indonesia, the US-backed dictator Suharto killed millions of his subjects, targeting communist sympathizers, ethnic Chinese and alleged leftists. A senior CIA operations officer in the 1960s later described Suharto’s 1965-66 US-assisted coup as s “the model operation” for the US-backed coup that eliminated the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, seven years later. “The CIA forged a document purporting to reveal a leftist plot to murder Chilean military leaders,” the officer wrote, “[just like] what happened in Indonesia in 1965.”

As John Pilger noted 10 years ago, “the US embassy in Jakarta supplied Suharto with a ‘zap list’ of Indonesian Communist party members and crossed off the names when they were killed or captured. … The deal was that Indonesia under Suharto would offer up what Richard Nixon had called ‘the richest hoard of natural resources, the greatest prize in south-east Asia.’ ”

“No single American action in the period after 1945,” wrote the historian Gabriel Kolko, “was as bloodthirsty as its role in Indonesia, for it tried to initiate [Suharto’s] massacre.”

Two years and three months after the Chilean coup, Suharto received a green light from Kissinger and the Gerald Ford White House to invade the small island nation of East Timor. With Washington’s approval and backing, Indonesia carried out genocidal massacres and mass rapes and killed at least 100,000 of the island’s residents.

Among the countless episodes of mass-murderous US savagery in the oil-rich Middle East over the last generation, few can match for the barbarous ferocity of the “Highway of Death,” where the “global policeman’s” forces massacred tens of thousands of surrendered Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait on Feb. 26 and 27, 1991. Journalist Joyce Chediac testified that:

US planes trapped the long convoys by disabling vehicles in the front, and at the rear, and then pounded the resulting traffic jams for hours. ‘It was like shooting fish in a barrel,’ said one US pilot. On the sixty miles of coastal highway, Iraqi military units sit in gruesome repose, scorched skeletons of vehicles and men alike, black and awful under the sun … for 60 miles every vehicle was strafed or bombed, every windshield is shattered, every tank is burned, every truck is riddled with shell fragments. No survivors are known or likely. … ‘Even in Vietnam I didn’t see anything like this. It’s pathetic,’ said Major Bob Nugent, an Army intelligence officer. … US pilots took whatever bombs happened to be close to the flight deck, from cluster bombs to 500-pound bombs. … US forces continued to drop bombs on the convoys until all humans were killed. So many jets swarmed over the inland road that it created an aerial traffic jam, and combat air controllers feared midair collisions. … The victims were not offering resistance. … It was simply a one-sided massacre of tens of thousands of people who had no ability to fight back or defend.

The victims’ crime was having been conscripted into an army controlled by a dictator perceived as a threat to US control of Middle Eastern oil. President George H.W. Bush welcomed the so-called Persian Gulf War as an opportunity to demonstrate America’s unrivaled power and new freedom of action in the post-Cold War world, where the Soviet Union could no longer deter Washington. Bush also heralded the “war” (really a one-sided imperial assault) as marking the end of the “Vietnam Syndrome,” the reigning political culture’s curious term for US citizens’ reluctance to commit US troops to murderous imperial mayhem.

As Noam Chomsky observed in 1992, reflecting on US efforts to maximize suffering in Vietnam by blocking economic and humanitarian assistance to the nation it had devastated: “No degree of cruelty is too great for Washington sadists.”

But Uncle Sam was only getting warmed up building his Iraqi body count in early 1991. Five years later, Bill Clinton’s US Secretary of State Madeline Albright told CBS News’ Leslie Stahl that the death of 500,000 Iraqi children due to US-led economic sanctions imposed after the first “Persian Gulf War” (a curious term for a one-sided US assault) was a “price … worth paying” for the advancement of inherently noble US goals.

“The United States,” Secretary Albright explained three years later, “is good. We try to do our best everywhere.”

In the years following the collapse of the counter-hegemonic Soviet empire, however, American neoliberal intellectuals like Thomas Friedman—an advocate of the criminal US bombing of Serbia—felt free to openly state that the real purpose of US foreign policy was to underwrite the profits of US-centered global capitalism. “The hidden hand of the market,” Friedman famously wrote in The New York Times Magazine in March 1999, as US bombs and missiles exploded in Serbia, “will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.”

In a foreign policy speech Sen. Barack Obama gave to the Chicago Council of Global Affairs on the eve of announcing his candidacy for the US presidency in the fall of 2006, Obama had the audacity to say the following in support of his claim that US citizens supported “victory” in Iraq: “The American people have been extraordinarily resolved. They have seen their sons and daughters killed or wounded in the streets of Fallujah.”

It was a spine-chilling selection of locales. In 2004, the ill-fated city was the site of colossal US war atrocities, crimes including the indiscriminate murder of thousands of civilians, the targeting even of ambulances and hospitals, and the practical leveling of an entire city by the US military in April and November. By one account, Incoherent Empire, Michael Mann wrote:

The US launched two bursts of ferocious assault on the city, in April and November of 2004 … [using] devastating firepower from a distance which minimizes US casualties. In April … military commanders claimed to have precisely targeted … insurgent forces, yet the local hospitals reported that many or most of the casualties were civilians, often women, children, and the elderly… [reflecting an] intention to kill civilians generally. … In November … [US] aerial assault destroyed the only hospital in insurgent territory to ensure that this time no one would be able to document civilian casualties. US forces then went through the city, virtually destroying it. Afterwards, Fallujah looked like the city of Grozny in Chechnya after Putin’s Russian troops had razed it to the ground.

The “global policeman’s” deployment of radioactive ordnance (depleted uranium) in Fallujah created an epidemic of infant mortality, birth defects, leukemia and cancer there.

Fallujah was just one especially graphic episode in a broader arch-criminal invasion that led to the premature deaths of at least 1 million Iraqi civilians and left Iraq as what Tom Engelhardt called “a disaster zone on a catastrophic scale hard to match in recent memory.” It reflected the same callous mindset behind the Pentagon’s early computer program name for ordinary Iraqis certain to be killed in the 2003 invasion: “bug-splat.” Uncle Sam’s petro-imperial occupation led to the death of at least 1 million Iraqi “bugs” (human beings). According to the respected journalist Nir Rosen in December 2007, “Iraq has been killed. … [T]he American occupation has been more disastrous than that of the Mongols who sacked Baghdad in the thirteenth century.”

Along with death came the ruthless and racist torture. In an essay titled “I Helped Create ISIS,” Vincent Emanuele, a former US Marine, recalled his enlistment in an operation that gave him nightmares more than a decade later:

I think about the hundreds of prisoners we took captive and tortured in makeshift detention facilities. … I vividly remember the marines telling me about punching, slapping, kicking, elbowing, kneeing and head-butting Iraqis. I remember the tales of sexual torture: forcing Iraqi men to perform sexual acts on each other while marines held knives against their testicles, sometimes sodomizing them with batons. … [T]hose of us in infantry units … round[ed] up Iraqis during night raids, zip-tying their hands, black-bagging their heads and throwing them in the back of HUMVEEs and trucks while their wives and kids collapsed to their knees and wailed. … Some of them would hold hands while marines would butt-stroke the prisoners in the face. … [W]hen they were released, we would drive them from the FOB (Forward Operating Base) to the middle of the desert and release them several miles from their homes. … After we cut their zip-ties and took the black bags off their heads, several of our more deranged marines would fire rounds from their AR-15s into their air or ground, scaring the recently released captives. Always for laughs. Most Iraqis would run, still crying from their long ordeal.

The award-winning journalist Seymour Hersh told the ACLU about the existence of classified Pentagon evidence files containing films of U.S-“global policeman” soldiers sodomizing Iraqi boys in front of their mothers behind the walls of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. “You haven’t begun to see [all the] … evil, horrible things done [by US soldiers] to children of women prisoners, as the cameras run,” Hersh told an audience in Chicago in the summer of 2014.

It isn’t just Iraq where Washington has wreaked sheer mass murderous havoc in the Middle East, always a region of prime strategic significance to the US thanks to its massive petroleum resources. In a recent Truthdig reflection on Syria, historian Dan Lazare reminds us that:

[Syrian President Assad’s] Baathist crimes pale in comparison to those of the US, which since the 1970s has invested trillions in militarizing the Persian Gulf and arming the ultra-reactionary petro-monarchies that are now tearing the region apart. The US has provided Saudi Arabia with crucial assistance in its war on Yemen, it has cheered on the Saudi blockade of Qatar, and it has stood by while the Saudis and United Arab Emirates send in troops to crush democratic protests in neighboring Bahrain. In Syria, Washington has worked hand in glove with Riyadh to organize and finance a Wahhabist holy war that has reduced a once thriving country to ruin.

Chomsky has called Barack Obama’s targeted drone assassination program “the most extensive global terrorism campaign the world has yet seen.” The program “officially is aimed at killing people who the administration believes might someday intend to harm the US and killing anyone else who happens to be nearby.” As Chomsky adds, “It is also a terrorism generating campaign—that is well understood by people in high places. When you murder somebody in a Yemen village, and maybe a couple of other people who are standing there, the chances are pretty high that others will want to take revenge.”

“We lead the world,” presidential candidate Obama explained, “in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good. … America is the last, best hope of earth.”

Obama elaborated in his first inaugural address. “Our security,” the president said, “emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint”—a fascinating commentary on Fallujah, Hiroshima, the US crucifixion of Southeast Asia, the “Highway of Death” and more.

Within less than half a year of his inauguration, Obama’s rapidly accumulating record of atrocities in the Muslim world would include the bombing of the Afghan village of Bola Boluk. Ninety-three of the dead villagers torn apart by US explosives in Bola Boluk were children. “In a phone call played on a loudspeaker on Wednesday to outraged members of the Afghan Parliament,” the New York Times reported, “the governor of Farah Province … said that as many as 130 civilians had been killed.” According to one Afghan legislator and eyewitness, “the villagers bought two tractor trailers full of pieces of human bodies to his office to prove the casualties that had occurred. Everyone at the governor’s cried, watching that shocking scene.” The administration refused to issue an apology or to acknowledge the “global policeman’s” responsibility.

By telling and sickening contrast, Obama had just offered a full apology and fired a White House official because that official had scared New Yorkers with an ill-advised Air Force One photo-shoot flyover of Manhattan that reminded people of 9/11. The disparity was extraordinary: Frightening New Yorkers led to a full presidential apology and the discharge of a White House staffer. Killing more than 100 Afghan civilians did not require any apology.

Reflecting on such atrocities the following December, an Afghan villager was moved to comment as follows: “Peace prize? He’s a killer. … Obama has only brought war to our country.” The man spoke from the village of Armal, where a crowd of 100 gathered around the bodies of 12 people, one family from a single home. The 12 were killed, witnesses reported, by US Special Forces during a late-night raid.

Obama was only warming up his “killer” powers. He would join with France and other NATO powers in the imperial decimation of Libya,

which killed more than 25,000 civilians and unleashed mass carnage in North Africa. The US-led assault on Libya was a disaster for black Africans and sparked the biggest refugee crisis since World War II.

Two years before the war on Libya, the Obama administration helped install a murderous right-wing coup regime in Honduras. Thousands of civilians and activists have been murdered by that regime.

The clumsy and stupid Trump has taken the imperial baton from the elegant and silver-tongued “imperial grandmaster” Obama, keeping the superpower’s vast global military machine set on kill. As Newsweek reported last fall, in a news item that went far below the national news radar screen in the age of the endless insane Trump clown show:

According to research from the nonprofit monitoring group Airwars … through the first seven months of the Trump administration, coalition air strikes have killed between 2,800 and 4,500 civilians. … Researchers also point to another stunning trend—the ‘frequent killing of entire families in likely coalition airstrikes.’ In May, for example, such actions led to the deaths of at least 57 women and 52 children in Iraq and Syria. … In Afghanistan, the U.N. reports a 67 percent increase in civilian deaths from US airstrikes in the first six months of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016.

That Trump murders with less sophistication, outward moral restraint and credible claim to embody enlightened Western values and multilateral commitment than Obama did is perhaps preferable to some degree. It is better for empire to be exposed in its full and ugly nakedness, to speed its overdue demise.

The US is not just the top menace only to peace on Earth. It is also the leading threat to personal privacy (as was made clearer than ever by the Edward Snowden revelations), to democracy (the US funds and equips repressive regimes around the world) and to a livable global natural environment (thanks in no small part to its role as headquarters of global greenhouse gassing and petro-capitalist climate denial).

The world can be forgiven, perhaps, if it does not join Eliot Cohen and Karl Vick in bemoaning the end of the “American Era,” whatever Trump’s contribution to that decline, which was well underway before he entered the Oval Office.

Ordinary Americans, too, can find reasons to welcome the decline of the American empire. As Chomsky noted in the late 1960s: “The costs of empire are in general distributed over the society as a whole, while its profits revert to a few within.”

The Pentagon system functions as a great form of domestic corporate welfare for high-tech “defense” (empire) firms like Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon—this while it steals trillions of dollars that might otherwise meet social and environmental needs at home and abroad. It is a significant mode of upward wealth distribution within “the homeland.”

The biggest costs have fallen on the many millions killed and maimed by the US military and allied and proxy forces in the last seven decades and before. The victims include the many US military veterans who have killed themselves, many of them haunted by their own participation in sadistic attacks and torture on defenseless people at the distant command of sociopathic imperial masters determined to enforce US hegemony by any and all means deemed necessary.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a new Marxist international.

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The International of Workers and Peoples

Although untold numbers of people are engaged in innumerable strug- gles against the capitalist juggernaut in their specific localities all around the world, struggles for substantive equality, including battles over race, gender, and class, depend on the fight against imperialism at the global level. Hence, there is a need for a new global organization of workers based on the model of Marx's First International.“ Such an International for the twenty-first century cannot simply consist of a group of elite in- tellectuals from the North engaged in World Social Forum-like discussion activities or in the promotion of social-democratic regulatory reforms as in the so-called Socialist and Progressive Internationals. Rather, it needs to be constituted as a workers-based and peoples-based organization, rooted from the beginning in a strong South-South alliance so as to place the struggle against imperialism at the center of the socialist revolt against capitalism, as contemplated by figures such as Chavez and Amin.

In 2011, just prior to his final illness, Chavez was preparing, following his next election, to launch what was to be called the New International (pointedly not a Fifth International) focusing on a South-South alliance and giving a global significance to socialism in the twenty-first centu- ry. This would have extended the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America to a global level.” This, however, never saw the light of day due to Chaver’s rapid decline and untimely death.

‘Meanwhile, a separate conception grew out of the efforts of Amin, working with the World Forum for Alternatives. Amin had long contem- plated a Fifth International, an idea he was still presenting as late as May 2018. But in July 2018, only a month before his death, this had been trans- formed into what he called an Internationale of Workers and Peoples, explicitly recognizing that a pure worker-based International that did not take into account the situation of peoples was inadequate in confronting imperialism.” This, he stated, would be an organization, not just a move- ment. It would be aimed at the

alliance of all working peoples of the world and not only those qualified as representatives of the proletariat...including all wage earners of the ser- ‘vices, peasants, farmers, and the peoples oppressed by modern capitalism. ‘The construction must also be based on the recognition and respect of di- ‘versity, whether of parties, trade unions, or other popular organizations of struggle, guaranteeing their real independence.... In the absence of [such revolutionary] progress the world would continue to be ruled by chaos, barbarian practices, and the destruction of the earth.\*

‘The creation of a New International cannot of course occur in a vacuum. but needs to be articulated within and as a product of the building of uni- fied mass organizations expanding at the grassroots level in conjunction with revolutionary movements and delinkings from the capitalist system. all over the world. It could not occur, in Amin’s view, without new ini- tiatives from the Global South to create broad alliances, as in the initial organized struggles associated with the Third World movement launched at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the struggle for a New Interna- tional Economic Order. These three elements — grassroots movements, delinking, and cross-country/cross-continent alliances—are all crucial in his conception of the anti-imperialist struggle. Today this needs to be united with the global ecological movement.

Such a universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism, Amin insisted, must be characterized by audacity and more audacity, breaking with the coordinates of the system at every point, and finding its ideal path in the principle of from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need, as the very definition of human community. Today we live in a time of the perfect coincidence of the struggles for freedom and ne- cessity, leading to a renewed struggle for freedom as necessity. The choice before us is unavoidable: ruin or revolution.

#### That requires rejecting the aff and critically interrogating the colonial discourse of the 1AC---plan focus distracts from crucial conservations about epistemic violence, accepting colonial erasure as a tragic but inevitable byproduct of policymaking.

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Many humanist efforts are specifically humanitarian in nature, in which individual students seek to ‘give back’ in recognition of their relative advantage in existing systems. In the context of internationalization, this framing may be preferable to market-driven approaches, yet its construction of relationality maintains the student in a position of benevolence and enlightenment vis-à-vis those they are understood to be ‘helping’ (Jefferess, 2008). In this ethical formation, students from the Global North are generally situated as those with superior knowledge, values, and experiences that they generously grant to the ‘less fortunate.’ Within this paternalistic dynamic, the student is rarely prompted to question the underlying systems or causes of inequality or to consider how they benefit from and perpetuate these systems. Rather, the Other becomes a vehicle for affirming their exceptionalism and moral ‘goodness’ – potentially as a means to justify their own privilege. Gaztambide-Fernández and Howard (2013) point out that this investment in “Being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize particular discourses” (p. 2). This framing then forecloses the opportunity for students to examine their own complicity, and may be understood as an example of what Tuck and Yang (2012), drawing on Malwhinney, describe as “moves to innocence,” through which an individual seeks to assuage their guilt, deny responsibility, preserve a positive self-image, and maintain their existing investments in harmful desired futures.

Thus, despite their important differences, both market-driven and humanist approaches to internationalization are often premised on developmental notions of humanity, and are shaped by a “convenient amnesia” of colonial histories and current structures of harm (Thobani as cited by Stone-Mediatore, 2011, p. 49). Questions that therefore arise include: Why does encountering difference in the context of internationalization often reproduce rather than disrupt assumptions about the supremacy of Western knowledge and society? How might humanitarian efforts abroad function as a means to avoid addressing local injustices? How do developmental logics limit the possibility of engaging in relationships premised on solidarity and self-implication rather than instrumentalization for affirmation of a benevolent self? What might prompt students to see their own material comforts as part of the cause of inequity? What might interrupt our satisfactions with existing formulations of self/subject and other/object, and is it possible to imagine an approach to ethics that begins and ends with neither?

Conclusion: Im/possible Ethical Demands

There is a danger that our critical approaches to the ethics of internationalization may be circularly repeating the very violence that we seek to disrupt. In order to make visible the ways that colonial categories and capitalist imperatives are reproduced, scholars of higher education need to historicize the deep entanglements of our institutions and our subjectivities with empire, trace the origins of our dearest concepts, face our own investments in the false promises of universal humanity and linear progress, and consider how all of these frame and thereby limit available ethical and educational possibilities. As Unterhalter and Carpentier (2010) note, “Global higher education seems uniquely well placed to serve the interests of redressing inequality, enhancing participatory debate and deliberation. But to do this requires higher education institutions recognizing problems of their past and present in order to contribute to ideas of justice for our future” (p. 29). Decolonial analysis, as I have offered in this paper, is just one means of doing this work.

However, analysis itself is insufficient. Having identified the depth of the problems we face, it is common to promptly begin the search for concepts and plans of action that can renew our hope and that we believe will lead to something better. This desire for guaranteed alternatives may be in part related to the fact that conversations about internationalization tend to be, as Waters (2012) suggests, “dominated and driven by educational practitioners – education institutions, state level policy makers and public bodies, as well as private, commercial enterprises – with a vested interest in the ultimate success of internationalising initiatives” (p. 127). The imperative toward immediate improvement and assured success is also a deeply embedded dimension of Western thought, which constantly seeks to reduce complexity and eliminate uncertainty in order to smoothly engineer the future. And there is good reason for seeking solutions; harmful practices and policies do not stop producing harm when we name them. Every critique therefore begs the follow-up questions: “So what? Now what?” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 227).

These questions are important, and answering them is one essential element of our responsibility as researchers and educators to contribute to the reduction of ongoing harm. There is a strong need to produce practical, accessible, and impactful resources for use in higher education classrooms, policy reforms, training for administrators, and social justice programming for students and staff. At the same time, these solutions often create their own unforeseen problems. Furthermore, desires for coherence, consensus, and guaranteed futures have all contributed to the reproduction of significant harms as certain experiences, individuals, and even entire communities are sacrificed or silenced in order to achieve these goals. Although we cannot live and act in a space of uncertainty and ambivalence at all times, the immediate search for practical action and answers can also foreclose difficult but necessary conversations and questions that have no easy resolution. We also need to learn to sit in this space of uncertainty and discomfort to consider questions with either no answer, or too many answers to count; to lay out on the table the contradictory elements of all possible answers to our ‘so what, now what’ questions; and to ask self-implicated questions about our own deep investments in a harmful system.

## CASE

### Tech ADV---1NC

#### American innovation linearly increases colonial violence.

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Let me begin by noting a few facts. High-income countries are the primary drivers of global ecological breakdown. The global North is responsible for 92 percent of emissions in excess of the planetary boundary (Hickel, 2020a), while the consequences of climate breakdown fall disproportionately upon the global South. The South already suffers the vast majority of the damage inflicted by climate breakdown, and if temperatures exceed 1.5 degrees centigrade, much of the tropics could experience heat events that exceed the limits of human survival (Zhang, Held, & Fueglistaler, 2021). Likewise, high-income countries are responsible for the majority of excess global resource use, with an average material footprint of 28 tons per capita per year – four times over the sustainable level (Bringezu, 2015). Crucially, these high levels of consumption depend on a significant net appropriation from the global South through unequal exchange, including 10.1 billion tons of embodied raw materials and 379 billion hours of embodied labor per year (Dorninger et al., 2021).

In other words, economic growth in the North relies on patterns of colonization: the appropriation of atmospheric commons, and the appropriation of Southern resources and labour. In terms of both emissions and resource use, the global ecological crisis is playing out along colonial lines. This is often framed as a problem of “ecological debt”, but this language – while useful – hardly captures the violence at stake.

Just as Northern growth is colonial in character, so too “green growth” visions tend to presuppose the perpetuation of colonial arrangements. Transitioning to 100 percent renewable energy should be done as rapidly as possible, but scaling solar panels, wind turbines and batteries requires enormous material extraction, and this will come overwhelmingly from the global South. Continued growth in the North means rising final energy demand, which will in turn require rising levels of extractivism. Complicating matters further, decarbonization cannot be accomplished fast enough to respect Paris targets as long as energy use in the global North remains so high (Hickel & Kallis, 2020). To compensate for this problem, IPCC models rely heavily on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) to get us out of trouble. But deploying BECCS at scale would require land for biofuel plantations up to three times the size of India, which would almost certainly be appropriated from the South. This is not an acceptable future, and is incompatible with socialist values (Hickel, 2020b).

Degrowth calls for rich nations to scale down throughput to sustainable levels, reducing aggregate energy use to enable a sufficiently rapid transition to renewables, and reducing aggregate resource use to reverse ecological breakdown. This demand is not just about ecology; rather, it is rooted in anti-colonial principles. Degrowth scholars and activists explicitly recognize the reality of ecological debt and call for an end to the colonial patterns of appropriation that underpin Northern growth, in order to release the South from the grip of extractivism and a future of catastrophic climate breakdown. Degrowth is, in other words, a demand for decolonization. Southern countries should be free to organize their resources and labor around meeting human needs rather than around servicing Northern growth.

Decolonization along these lines is a crucial precondition for successful development in the South. Dependency theorists have pointed out that “catch-up” development is impossible within a system predicated on appropriation and polarized accumulation. This is true also from an ecological perspective. The alternative is to pursue a strategy of convergence: throughput should decline in the North to get back within sustainable levels while increasing in the South to meet human needs, converging at a level consistent with ecological stability and universal human welfare.

This much is straightforward. But there are further implications of degrowth that are worth drawing out here. For degrowth, the problem is not ultimately the behavior of individual “consumers” (as in mainstream environmentalist thought) but rather the structure and logic of the underlying economic system, namely, capitalism. We know that capitalism is predicated on surplus extraction and accumulation; it must take more from labor and nature than it gives back. As Marxist ecologists have pointed out, such a system necessarily generates inequalities and ecological breakdown. But many economic systems have been extractive in the past; what makes capitalism distinctive, and uniquely problematic, is that it is organized around, and dependent on, perpetual growth. In other words, capital seeks not only surplus, but an exponentially rising surplus.

To understand why this is a problem, we have to grasp what “growth” means. People commonly assume that GDP growth is an increase in value (or provisioning, or well-being), when, in fact, it is primarily an increase in commodity production, represented in terms of price. This distinction between value and price is important. In order to realize surplus value, capital seeks to enclose and commodify free commons in order extract payment for access, or, in the realm of production, to depress the prices of inputs to below the value that is actually derived from them. Both tendencies require appropriation from colonial or neo-colonial “frontiers”, where labor and nature can be taken for free, or close to free, and where costs can be “externalized”. In this sense, capitalist growth is intrinsically colonial in character, and has been for 500 years. Enclosure, colonization, mass enslavement, extractivism, sweatshops, ecological breakdown – all of this has been propelled by the growth imperative and its demand for cheap labor and nature.

Of course, there is nothing “naturally” cheap about labor and nature at the frontier. On the contrary, they have to be actively cheapened. To do this, European capitalists advanced a dualist ontology that cast humans as subjects with mind and agency, and nature as an object to be exploited and controlled for human ends. Into the category of “nature” they shunted not only all nonhuman beings, but also Black and Indigenous people, and most women, all of whom were cast as not-quite-fully-human, in order to legitimize dispossession, enslavement and exploitation (Federici, 2004; Patel & Moore, 2017). Racist discourses were leveraged to cheapen the lives of others for the sake of growth. Similar discourses are used today to justify wages in the South that remain below the level of subsistence (Hickel, 2020d).

#### Renewables heighten colonial exploitation and environmental destruction.

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The phrase “clean energy” normally conjures up happy, innocent images of warm sunshine and fresh wind. But while sunshine and wind is obviously clean, the infrastructure we need to capture it is not. Far from it. The transition to renewables is going to require a dramatic increase in the extraction of metals and rare-earth minerals, with real ecological and social costs.

We need a rapid transition to renewables, yes—but scientists warn that we can’t keep growing energy use at existing rates. No energy is innocent. The only truly clean energy is less energy.

In 2017, the World Bank released a little-noticed report that offered the first comprehensive look at this question. It models the increase in material extraction that would be required to build enough solar and wind utilities to produce an annual output of about 7 terawatts of electricity by 2050. That’s enough to power roughly half of the global economy. By doubling the World Bank figures, we can estimate what it will take to get all the way to zero emissions—and the results are staggering: 34 million metric tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead, 50 million tons of zinc, 162 million tons of aluminum, and no less than 4.8 billion tons of iron.

In some cases, the transition to renewables will require a massive increase over existing levels of extraction. For neodymium—an essential element in wind turbines—extraction will need to rise by nearly 35 percent over current levels. Higher-end estimates reported by the World Bank suggest it could double.

The same is true of silver, which is critical to solar panels. Silver extraction will go up 38 percent and perhaps as much as 105 percent. Demand for indium, also essential to solar technology, will more than triple and could end up skyrocketing by 920 percent.

And then there are all the batteries we’re going to need for power storage. To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium—an eye-watering 2,700 percent increase over current levels of extraction.

That’s just for electricity. We also need to think about vehicles. This year, a group of leading British scientists submitted a letter to the U.K. Committee on Climate Change outlining their concerns about the ecological impact of electric cars. They agree, of course, that we need to end the sale and use of combustion engines. But they pointed out that unless consumption habits change, replacing the world’s projected fleet of 2 billion vehicles is going to require an explosive increase in mining: Global annual extraction of neodymium and dysprosium will go up by another 70 percent, annual extraction of copper will need to more than double, and cobalt will need to increase by a factor of almost four—all for the entire period from now to 2050.

The problem here is not that we’re going to run out of key minerals—although that may indeed become a concern. The real issue is that this will exacerbate an already existing crisis of overextraction. Mining has become one of the biggest single drivers of deforestation, ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss around the world. Ecologists estimate that even at present rates of global material use, we are overshooting sustainable levels by 82 percent.

Take silver, for instance. Mexico is home to the Peñasquito mine, one of the biggest silver mines in the world. Covering nearly 40 square miles, the operation is staggering in its scale: a sprawling open-pit complex ripped into the mountains, flanked by two waste dumps each a mile long, and a tailings dam full of toxic sludge held back by a wall that’s 7 miles around and as high as a 50-story skyscraper. This mine will produce 11,000 tons of silver in 10 years before its reserves, the biggest in the world, are gone.

To transition the global economy to renewables, we need to commission up to 130 more mines on the scale of Peñasquito. Just for silver.

Lithium is another ecological disaster. It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely even started, and it’s already a crisis.

And all of this is just to power the existing global economy. Things become even more extreme when we start accounting for growth. As energy demand continues to rise, material extraction for renewables will become all the more aggressive—and the higher the growth rate, the worse it will get.

It’s important to keep in mind that most of the key materials for the energy transition are located in the global south. Parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will likely become the target of a new scramble for resources, and some countries may become victims of new forms of colonization. It happened in the 17th and 18th centuries with the hunt for gold and silver from South America. In the 19th century, it was land for cotton and sugar plantations in the Caribbean. In the 20th century, it was diamonds from South Africa, cobalt from Congo, and oil from the Middle East. It’s not difficult to imagine that the scramble for renewables might become similarly violent.

If we don’t take precautions, clean energy firms could become as destructive as fossil fuel companies—buying off politicians, trashing ecosystems, lobbying against environmental regulations, even assassinating community leaders who stand in their way.

#### Other capitalist countries are an alt cause to rogue AI development

#### No superintelligence---too far off, technical complexities overwhelm.

Geist 15, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, he received his doctorate in history from the University of North Carolina in 2013. (Edward Moore, 8-9-2015, "Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, https://thebulletin.org/2015/08/is-artificial-intelligence-really-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/)

Convinced that sufficient “intelligence” can overcome almost any obstacle, Bostrom acknowledges few limits on what artificial intelligences might accomplish. Engineering realities rarely enter into Bostrom’s analysis, and those that do contradict the thrust of his argument. He admits that the theoretically optimal intelligence, a “perfect Bayesian agent that makes probabilistically optimal use of available information,” will forever remain “unattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer.” Yet Bostrom’s postulated “superintelligences” seem uncomfortably close to this ideal. The author offers few hints of how machine superintelligences would circumvent the computational barriers that render the perfect Bayesian agent impossible, other than promises that the advantages of artificial components relative to human brains will somehow save the day. But over the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines, AI researchers have come to the realization that there is far more to intelligence than simply deploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons. In fact, the history of artificial intelligence suggests that Bostrom’s “superintelligence” is a practical impossibility.

### Imperialism ADV---1NC

#### Can’t solve imperialism---military still exists

#### The American public loves the bomb—supports the use of nukes in warfighting—democratization increases risk of use

Sagan and Valentino 2017 – Scott D Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and Benjamin Valentino is an Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” *International Security* Volume 42, No. 1) bhb

The novel survey experiments described in this article, by re-creating the trade-off between an atomic attack and the risk to the lives of U.S. soldiers that the United States faced at the end of World War II, produced many surprising findings. The U.S. public's willingness to use nuclear weapons and deliberately kill foreign civilians has not changed as much since 1945 as many scholars have assumed. Contrary to the nuclear taboo thesis, a majority of Americans are willing to support the use of a nuclear weapon against an Iranian city killing 100,000 civilians. Contrary to the theory that Americans accept the noncombatant immunity norm, an even larger percentage of the U.S. public was willing to kill 100,000 Iranian civilians with conventional weapons. Women are as hawkish as men and, in some scenarios, are even more willing to support the use of nuclear weapons. Belief in the value of retribution is strongly related to support for using nuclear weapons, and a large majority of those who favor the use of nuclear weapons against Iran stated that the Iranian people bore some of the responsibility for that attack because they had not overthrown their government.

Future research will be necessary to determine whether these findings hold only for Americans or whether they are generalizable to the citizens of other countries. The U.S. public may be an outlier with regard to supporting nuclear weapons use, as it is an international outlier with respect to support for the death penalty. A 2016 public opinion poll in the United Kingdom, for example, found that approval ratings for President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan are much lower than those in the United States (28 percent in the United Kingdom compared with 45 percent in the United States).88 It would be especially useful to focus on public attitudes about nuclear weapons use among key U.S. friends and allies. It would be valuable to know, for example, how the Israeli, the British, or the French public views potential uses of nuclear weapons in scenarios, such as those analyzed above, in which they are contemplating trade-offs between saving their own soldiers versus killing foreign noncombatants. Future survey experiments could provide new information not only about allied publics’ views regarding potential uses of their own nuclear arsenals, but also about whether these publics would support or oppose the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in specific scenarios, which could be an important consideration for U.S. leaders contemplating nuclear use.

Further research will also be needed to determine whether the U.S. public maintains these priorities under other wartime or crisis scenarios. It is possible that the widespread hostility that the American public harbors toward Iran helped produce these findings, and in a war against other foreign powers against which there is less hostility, there would be less willingness to use nuclear weapons or kill noncombatants. Still, it seems likely that the U.S. public would be hostile toward the population of any foreign state that is at war with the United States. Yet it is also possible that the U.S. public would feel differently about killing foreign civilians in a war that the United States initiated instead of one sparked by an enemy surprise attack. It would also be valuable to know how strongly U.S. public attraction to nuclear use in our experiments was influenced by the fact that the United States’ adversary in the war was an Islamic state in the Middle East. One could explore these effects through new experiments that vary the religious and racial identity of potential victims of a U.S. nuclear attack.89

We have been careful in these experiments not to “prime” the respondents in ways that might bias the results. For example, in our stories, we did not mention the possible environmental effects of nuclear weapons. We described the victims as “civilians” rather than “innocent women and children.” We mentioned only “immediate deaths and long-term fatalities” from the nuclear attack, and did not describe the gruesome details of fatal burns or radiation sickness. We did not raise the possibility that an attack targeted against a city as a “shock strategy” would violate both the laws of armed conflict and U.S. nuclear weapons employment guidance, and thus would also likely be opposed by many senior U.S. military leaders.90 Nor did we expose subjects to cues from political elites who opposed the bombing.91 All these factors could influence public support for or opposition to the use of nuclear weapons or violations of the noncombatant immunity norm in the real world and should be studied in the future.

In the final analysis, our survey experiments cannot tell us how future U.S. presidents and their top advisers would weigh their options if they found themselves in a conflict in which they faced a trade-off between risking large-scale U.S. military fatalities and killing large numbers of foreign noncombatants. Nevertheless, these surveys do tell us something unsettling about the instincts of the U.S. public concerning nuclear weapons and noncombatant immunity. When provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the first use of nuclear weapons a taboo, and their commitment to noncombatant immunity in wartime is shallow. Instead, a majority of Americans prioritize winning the war quickly and saving the lives of U.S. soldiers, even if that means killing large numbers of foreign noncombatants.

Both just war doctrine and the laws of armed conflict require leaders and soldiers to make active efforts and accept risks in war to avoid the deaths of foreign civilians. Michael Walzer's “doctrine of double intention,” for example, requires that soldiers not just intend to attack only legitimate military targets, but that they also take active measures to minimize unintended collateral damage, including accepting at least some risk to themselves.92 With respect to international law, Article 57 of the Geneva Protocol I demands that all signatories “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life.”93 Although the “principle of feasible precaution” may require military professionals to take some personal risk to protect noncombatants or require political leaders to take some risk of the loss of soldiers to protect foreign noncombatants, there is no agreement on the proper risk ratio. How many soldiers’ lives on one's own side is it appropriate to risk to reduce the risk of the unintended killing of foreign noncombatants?94

We were not surprised by the finding that most Americans place a higher value on the life of an American soldier than the life of a foreign noncombatant. What was surprising, however, was the radical extent of that preference. Our experiments suggest that the majority of Americans find a 1:100 risk ratio to be morally acceptable. They were willing to kill 2 million Iranian civilians to save 20,000 U.S. soldiers. One respondent who approved of the conventional air strike that killed 100,000 Iranian civilians candidly expressed even more extreme preferences regarding proportionality and risk ratios, while displacing U.S. responsibility for the attack onto the Iranian people: “I would sacrifice 1 million enemies versus 1 of our military. Their choice, their death.”

U.S. political leaders have, in some important cases in the past, been aware of public sentiments regarding retribution and revenge and have used the threat of public pressure in favor of nuclear attacks to add credibility to thinly veiled nuclear threats. President George H.W. Bush, for example, wrote to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in January 1991 that “the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons…. The American people would demand the strongest possible response.”95 Secretary of State James Baker amplified the message in a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz: “If the conflict starts, God forbid, and chemical or biological weapons are used against our forces, the American people would demand vengeance. We have the means to exact it.”96 Although scholars now know that the Bush administration had already decided not to use nuclear weapons to respond to any Iraqi chemical or biological weapons attack, Saddam Hussein did not know that and took the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons use seriously.97 Our survey experiments demonstrate that such public pressures to use nuclear weapons are not fanciful and should be taken seriously by both U.S. leaders and any foreign government contemplating war against the United States. Indeed, these experiments suggest that pressures for escalating violence, including a public demand for vengeance and pressure to use nuclear weapons, extend beyond scenarios in which the United States is responding to nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.

Past surveys that show a very substantial decline in U.S. public support for the 1945 dropping of the atomic bombs are a misleading guide to how the public would react if placed in similar wartime circumstances in the future. It is fortunate that the United States has not faced wartime conditions in the nuclear era in which U.S. political leaders and the public had to contemplate such grave trade-offs.98 Today, as in 1945, the U.S. public is unlikely to serve as a serious constraint on any president who might consider using nuclear weapons in the crucible of war.

#### The AFF’s claim that the US must lead on socialism is based on a western teleology that drives a never-ending crusade against difference---that sustains global imperialist governance and turns solvency by motivating backlash against cooperative efforts.

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The intellectual deficiency of liberal internationalism

The contribution of liberal internationalism to the refusal to study stems from its universalist teleology: the belief that Western-style liberal democracy is the only viable and legitimate form of government for every human society, as expressed in the 2002 National Security Strategy and in Blair’s Chicago speech; that every human society is at any time capable of adopting liberal democracy; and that human progress depends entirely on liberal democracy. This belief is amply reflected in the Soviet-style language of much US rhetoric about the inevitable march of Western-inspired democratic progress.20 This being so, there is really no intellectual point in studying the cultures, societies and traditions of any other country; and there is a very strong unconscious emotional motive not to study them, for to do so might – God forbid! – lead liberal internationalists to question whether their models really are either universally valid or inevitably bound to prevail.

Their teleology also makes many liberal internationalists fatally receptive to the blandishments of ambitious local pseudo-democratic charmers such as Ahmad Chalabi, who have learned to speak the language of liberal internationalism. No very sophisticated seduction is necessary – a few phrases from a liberal-democratic phrase book are enough. Western liberal internationalists have read political leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and Alexei Navalny as Western-style liberals, in the process obscuring both their nationalism and the realities of the political cultures in which they operate. And liberals built up the reputations of sympathetic liberal intellectuals such as former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, ushering him to power in a country which – as was already apparent in Ghani’s 2008 book and has been amply confirmed by subsequent events – he did not really understand and was quite incapable of governing.21

A few lines from liberal phrase books substantially constitute the intellectual basis on which the West set out to reconstruct Afghanistan after 2001, with dire results that are now evident.22 Once again, liberal-internationalist teleology contributed to a blind refusal – for 20 years – to study Afghan history and culture, and to learn from the failure of previous attempts to create a modern Afghan state, or from the success (in their own culturally specific and ferocious way) of the Taliban.

Elections rigged by local warlords were presented as and believed to be ‘the Afghan people choosing democracy’. Afghan non-governmental organizations in Kabul (some of them brave and committed, others cynical, phony and opportunist) were dubbed ‘Afghan civil society’. Their importance in Afghanistan was colossally inflated by liberal internationalists, and their overwhelming dependence on Western support was ignored.23 Liberal inter-nationalism was not solely responsible for turning the Afghan campaign from a limited anti-terrorism operation into a vast, misconceived, inappropriate, bloodstained, monstrously expensive and ultimately doomed project of democratic nation-building – but it certainly played its part.

Blinded by ideological self-deceit and conceit, liberal internationalists participated in what was in effect a massive public fraud on Western voters, taxpayers, and most of all the Western soldiers who were killed and disabled in Afghanistan: that the painted facade of Afghan ‘democracy’ was that of a hard-working building site and not a ramshackle slum. Demonstrating the extraordinary grip of this illusion on some members of the liberal-internationalist-cum-neoconservative camp, at least as a rhetorical trope, Anne Applebaum could write an article in support of the failed Western campaign there in August 2021 entitled ‘Liberal Democracy Is Worth a Fight’ even after the collapse of the Afghan state had demonstrated its utter rottenness and the falsity of its ‘democracy’.24

Moreover, as we have seen in Afghanistan, as in Libya and elsewhere, the liberal-internationalist ethos (based on what Weber called Gesinnungsethik, an ‘ethic of sentiment’, as opposed to the ethic of responsibility, prudence and study that he said is appropriate to statesmen) has not fostered any true sense of Western responsibility to and for these countries. A combination of self-flattering, feel-good humanitarianism and shallow ideological nostrums has not motivated Western societies and their elites to make a real commitment to turn Afghanistan into a successful democracy – at least not if that involved personal risk and sacrifice. American, British and some other NATO troops have fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties, and many aid workers have demonstrated courage and commitment. Most official Western institutions, however, cited the infamous principle of the ‘duty of care’ as a reason to keep their staffs out of real danger, while the vast majority of Western politicians and commentators who advocated state-building in Afghanistan and elsewhere limited their visits to a few days in secure locations. In the end, the remaining Westerners fled to the airport – in the case of the Dutch and Swedes, apparently without informing their Afghan staff that they were abandoning them.25

Do Deudney and Ikenberry think a spirit like that will ever succeed in building democracy in places like Afghanistan, and against foes like the Taliban? A phrase from a BBC report on the evacuation of Westerners from Kabul says it all: ‘Staff at the Dutch embassy have faced criticism after saying they did not have time [to] tell Afghan colleagues they were going.’26 So much for the most successful alliance in history, as the liberal establishment is fond of calling NATO. Nor, it seems, will any Western general, official, politician or public intellectual be held personally responsible for the Afghan disaster. What we can do is learn the lessons of that disaster, and make sure that those intellectually responsible do not simply hop lightly from one cause to another.

In this vein, it is essential that Ikenberry and Deudney’s ideology not be allowed to conceal its complicity in the disasters of Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. After Vietnam, there seemed to be a good chance that there would at last be a rigorous critique of the nationalist myths of America’s right and duty to lead the world to freedom and democracy, of American exceptionalism and righteous innocence, that had helped to foster and justify the war in Vietnam. But as C. Vann Woodward wrote bitterly at the time: ‘The characteristic American adjustment to the current foreign and domestic enigmas that confound our national myths has not been to abandon the myths but to reaffirm them. Solutions are sought along traditional lines … Whatever the differences and enmities that divide advocates and opponents (and they are admittedly formidable), both sides seem predominantly unshaken in their adherence to one or another or all of the common national myths.’27

Liberal-internationalist ideology, feeding into American nationalist exceptionalism, played a critical role in erasing Vietnam’s lessons from America’s public consciousness. As a result, in the run-up to the Iraq War, I discovered to my horror that only a small minority of American students whom I taught – most previously schooled by liberal-internationalist colleagues – had ever heard of the My Lai massacre. Consequently, only a few were capable of understanding that US troops might commit atrocities again. And only a tiny proportion of American liberal-internationalist intellectuals seemed capable of understanding that problems in the future US occupation of Iraq might stem not only from the nature of Iraq, but from that of the United States itself.

The blinkered arrogance of liberal internationalism

An even more damaging aspect of liberal-internationalist ideology, amply on display in Deudney and Ikenberry’s essay, is its denial of legitimacy to other political systems. The liberal-internationalist crusading impulse to destroy those systems in turn produces a compulsive need to present them as aggressive and comprehensive enemies, thereby helping to justify hostility to them. Hence the authors’ description of China as representing a ‘comprehensive threat’ to the West. It doesn’t. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is not trying to spread revolution or subvert other political systems. In Africa and Latin America, its presence is almost purely economic. Outside the South China Sea, China has one very small naval station at Djibouti. America, by contrast, has dozens of very large overseas bases. The US bases in South Korea and Guam, and at Okinawa and Yokosuka in Japan, also mean that there is not even a real threat to America’s military presence and alliances in East Asia – unless one assumes that the Chinese are maniacs who would risk nuclear annihilation by a direct attack on the US.

China has created – for the moment at least; it may not last – an example of successful authoritarian state-led capitalist development not entirely unlike those previously set by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Other countries are free to imitate that example, or not, as they choose. The challenge to the West is to strengthen the attractiveness of our own example through successful (though often painful) domestic reform. But Ikenberry and Deudney’s great democratic crusade requires a great infidel threat as an enemy and justification, and they must force China into the frame left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, however bad the fit.

In his book Nationalism, Elie Kedourie incisively critiqued this attitude and its consequences, as it emerged in a soft form in Immanuel Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace and in a very hard form in the external policies of the French Revolution.28 In eighteenth-century Europe, Kedourie wrote, the ‘balance of power’ system which limited wars and created a space for common European cultural development rested on the mutual recognition of the legitimacy of states with different religions and political systems, as this had emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the great religious wars:

[The] assumption was that the title of any government to rule did not depend on the origins of its power. Thus the society of European states admitted all kinds of republics, of hereditary and elective monarchies, of constitutional and despotic regimes. But on the principle advocated by the revolutionaries, the title of all governments then existing was put into question; since they did not derive their sovereignty from the nation, they were usurpers with whom no agreement need be binding, and to whom subjects owed no allegiance. It is clear that such a doctrine would envenom international quarrels, and render them quite recalcitrant to the methods of traditional statecraft; it would indeed subvert all international relations as hitherto known … By its very nature, this new style ran to extremes. It represented politics as a fight for principles, not the endless composition of claims in conflict. But since principles do not abolish interests, a pernicious confusion resulted. The ambitions of a state or the designs of a faction took on the purity of principle, compromise was treason, and a tone of exasperated intransigence became common between rivals and opponents.29

Does this not sound all too like the conflation of liberal-internationalist ideology and American hegemonic ambition in the world today? Or, as Woodward wrote in a great critique of the American myths that contributed to the disaster of Vietnam and a range of criminal US actions internationally,

The true American mission, according to those who support this view, is a moral crusade on a worldwide scale. Such people are likely to concede no validity whatever and grant no hearing to the opposing point of view, and to appeal to a higher law to justify bloody and revolting means in the name of a noble end … The irony of the moralistic approach, when exploited by nationalism, is that the high motive to end justice and immorality actually results in making war more amoral and horrible than ever and in shattering the foundations of the political and moral order upon which peace has to be built.30

In the 1790s, the denial of legitimacy to states not based on the ‘sovereignty of the people’ became mixed up with French nationalism and imperialism, and as a political ideal was carried forth on the bayonets of the French Republican and Napoleonic armies. But, as Maximilien Robespierre remarked in one of his more lucid moments, ‘no-one likes armed missionaries’. The marriage of the French revolutionary threat to states with French military aggression against populations bred conservative–nationalist reactions in Germany and elsewhere that were to haunt Europe for generations to come and produce their most dreadful fruits in the mid-twentieth century. This is why, in his book The China Choice, Hugh White makes US (and Australian) recognition of the legitimacy of the Chinese state system a central condition of peaceful coexistence with China.31 Ikenberry and Deudney do say that selective cooperation with China on issues such as climate change should accompany wider US geopolitical and ideological confrontation with China. But first of all, if climate change escapes human control, do they really think that historians 100 years from now are going to think that present US disagreements with China were the most important dangers facing humanity, or America? And secondly, is intensive cooperation against climate change really compatible with deep, ideologically driven distrust of China, and an intensive propaganda campaign to undermine the Chinese communist state? These are the policies of the Biden administration, which Ikenberry and Deudney strongly support.

The Chinese and Russian governments exaggerate (for obvious domestic effect) the degree of any active US official commitment to overthrowing them. However, congressionally funded advocacy institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy and news outlets like Voice of America certainly display this commitment, while successive US administrations have made clear their view that the existing state systems of both countries are fundamentally illegitimate. Moscow and Beijing naturally regard this position as a threat to vital state interests, just as Americans regard Russian interference in the US electoral process as a threat to the vital interests of the United States. The result has been a vicious circle of reciprocal paranoia that is utterly destructive of hopes for serious cooperation in any field.

Liberal internationalists also need to understand that many ordinary citizens of Russia, China and other authoritarian states share their anxieties about American intentions. Bitter historical memories of chaos and mass suffering have created a deep sense that the overthrow of the existing state system will lead to the destruction of the state itself, with tragic consequences for the population. In recent years, these fears have been intensified by the terrible consequences of the US and allied destruction of the regimes in Iraq and Libya, which did indeed lead to the collapse of those states. Such examples have fostered a widespread popular belief in China, Iran and Russia that Americans are deliberately seeking the destruction of their respective states, at whatever cost to their peoples. I am sure Ikenberry and Deudney do not support any such agenda. But can they sincerely state that the neo-conservatives – with whom the liberal internationalists heavily overlap in supporting an American strategy of spreading democracy – do not?

#### Accidents discourse depoliticizes military technology and rationalizes military planning as the only possible solution to instability

Meiches 2020 – Benjamin Meiches is a professor in the Political Science Economics department at University of Washington-Tacoma (“Wars of excess: Georges Bataille, solar economy, and the accident in the age of precision war,” Security Dialogue, 2020, Vol. 51(2-3) 268–284)

With the rise of industrial warfare, accidents became a part of the discourse of armed conflict. In international relations literatures, this is perhaps most apparent in the case of accidental nuclear launch given the potential for nuclear use to cause planetary destruction (Sagan, 1995). However, the accident reappeared as a problem with the rise of precision warfare because of the explicit emphasis on exactness, the reduction of war’s lethality, and the deliberate, even careful, character of war. In short, the ability to govern war precisely existed in tension with the probability of socalled accidental deaths. Precision warfare was, by its nature, supposed to become accident free. Patricia Owens (2003) and Maja Zehfuss (2011) have both offered excellent analyses of the dangerous character of this logic. As Owens (2003: 599–600) opines, ‘at issue [in this form of warfare] is how civilian deaths are legitimated and under what guises this occurs’. According to Owens, the accident functions as a way of explicating and extending martial power and, more specifically, of discursively producing an event as accidental: ‘the events labelled “accidents” were not accidents until they had been narrated as such, contrary to the liberal state (and positivist) assumption that they must self-evidently be accidents’ (Owens, 2003: 616). Owens and Zehfuss explain how the category of the accident enables advocates of precision warfare to deny any relationship between supposed precise technologies and their capacity to injure and kill. In this way, Owens and Zehfuss also confirm the broader observation of Paul Virilio (2006) that the accident constitutes an integral part of any technology (martial or not). According to this model, the birth of a technology is also the birth of the accident, and, consequently, any perspective that treats the accident as derivative is engaging in a depoliticization of the dangers of technology and speed. This process of depoliticization guts the possibility of democratic politics in discussions of security and war (Glezos, 2013).

Bataille’s writings on war illuminate several additional elements of accidents and risk-transfer war. First, critical security studies literature chiefly approaches the accident through the lens of ideology, discourse, and narration. Here, the accident functions as a kind of discursive trick that separates legitimate and illegitimate violence and, therefore, legitimate and illegitimate modes of warfare. This point is an important rejoinder to the rhetoric of risk-transfer warfare. However, Bataille’s theories focus less on discursive or epistemological claims about the accident and more on its ontological status. As the previous section outlined, Bataille views warfare as a mode of expenditure that emerges from conditions of excess. For Bataille (1985), excesses emerge from a type of ‘base matter’ that is not subject to representation and can only be testified to through inner experience. This form of excess, which cannot be fully sensed or described, is thus ontologically contingent and cannot be known in advance. Put differently, for Bataille, contingencies are a constitutive part of armed conflict regardless of the terminology or discourse that surrounds them. Industrial warfare sought to eliminate these contingencies in order to function according to a model of rational accumulation. The recent rise of precision, risk, and the accident as frames for understanding contingency occurs as part of this much larger paradigmatic shift to reframe war as a problem of utility, rationality, and ends. The accident constitutes only the newest method not just of legitimizing war but also of governing and eliminating the problem of excess. Since warfare involves expenditures of excess, it is necessarily rife with contingencies and accidents. The accident thus operates as a liminal event in modern armed conflict, both as an epistemological invention to legitimate specific deaths and injuries, and as the resistance of base matter and solar economy to human efforts at rationalization and governance.

These theoretical observations make several interventions into debates about precision warfare. First, Bataille extends existing critiques of risk-transfer warfare by both situating them as part of a broader shift in modern warfare and establishing that the very terms of the discourse are antithetical to the conditions of solar economy. Bataille’s thought shows how the structure of rationality in riskless war relies on the accident as a discursive supplement in order to comprehend the excesses that will recur in a condition of solar economy even when armed conflict is defined by utility, rationality, and accumulation. The accident is not only an ideological trick designed to depoliticize, but also an epistemological supplement that insulates the precision paradigm from its inability to grapple with excess. This provides an alternative way of interpreting the concern for the accident since, following Bataille, precision legitimates modern warfare by seeking to eliminate the excesses that have continually reappeared in spite of the broader transformation of war into a rational exercise. Precision and the language of the accident constitute only the latest effort to govern the excessive character of war.

# 2NC

#### The aff’s “Extinction first” framing is a new link---it willingly sacrifices billions in the Global South at the altar of a miniscule risk of extinction---there’s a reason only white elites like their impact framing.

Torres 21, PhD candidate at Leibniz Universität Hannover. Previously studied at Harvard University and Brandeis University. Author of Morality, Foresight, and Human Flourishing: An Introduction to Existential Risks (Phil, July 28th, “The Dangerous Ideas of ‘Longtermism’ and ‘Existential Risk’,” *Current Affairs*, <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2021/07/the-dangerous-ideas-of-longtermism-and-existential-risk>, Accessed 10-27-2021)

It’s this line of reasoning that leads Bostrom, Greaves, MacAskill, and others to argue that even the tiniest reductions in “existential risk” are morally equivalent to saving the lives of literally billions of living, breathing, actual people. For example, Bostrom writes that if there is “a mere 1 percent chance” that 10^54 conscious beings (most living in computer simulations) come to exist in the future, then “we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.” Greaves and MacAskill echo this idea in a 2021 paper by arguing that “even if there are ‘only’ 1014 lives to come … , a reduction in near-term risk of extinction by one millionth of one percentage point would be equivalent in value to a million lives saved.”

To make this concrete, imagine Greaves and MacAskill in front of two buttons. If pushed, the first would save the lives of 1 million living, breathing, actual people. The second would increase the probability that 10^14 currently unborn people come into existence in the far future by a teeny-tiny amount. Because, on their longtermist view, there is no fundamental moral difference between saving actual people and bringing new people into existence, these options are morally equivalent. In other words, they’d have to flip a coin to decide which button to push. (Would you? I certainly hope not.) In Bostrom’s example, the morally right thing is obviously to sacrifice billions of living human beings for the sake of even tinier reductions in existential risk, assuming a minuscule 1 percent chance of a larger future population: 1054 people.

All of this is to say that even if billions of people were to perish in the coming climate catastrophe, so long as humanity survives with enough of civilization intact to fulfill its supposed “potential,” we shouldn’t be too concerned. In the grand scheme of things, non-runaway climate change will prove to be nothing more than a “mere ripple” —a “small misstep for mankind,” however terrible a “massacre for man” it might otherwise be.

Even worse, since our resources for reducing existential risk are finite, Bostrom argues that we must not “fritter [them] away” on what he describes as “feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy.” Such projects would include, on this account, not just saving people in the Global South—those most vulnerable, especially women—from the calamities of climate change, but all other non-existential philanthropic causes, too. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer writes about Bostrom in his 2015 book on Effective Altruism, “to refer to donating to help the global poor … as a ‘feel-good project’ on which resources are ‘frittered away’ is harsh language.” But it makes perfectly good sense within Bostrom’s longtermist framework, according to which “priority number one, two, three, and four should … be to reduce existential risk.” Everything else is smaller fish not worth frying.

If this sounds appalling, it’s because it is appalling. By reducing morality to an abstract numbers game, and by declaring that what’s most important is fulfilling “our potential” by becoming simulated posthumans among the stars, longtermists not only trivialize past atrocities like WWII (and the Holocaust) but give themselves a “moral excuse” to dismiss or minimize comparable atrocities in the future. This is one reason that I’ve come to see longtermism as an immensely dangerous ideology. It is, indeed, akin to a secular religion built around the worship of “future value,” complete with its own “secularised doctrine of salvation,” as the Future of Humanity Institute historian Thomas Moynihan approvingly writes in his book X-Risk. The popularity of this religion among wealthy people in the West—especially the socioeconomic elite—makes sense because it tells them exactly what they want to hear: not only are you ethically excused from worrying too much about sub-existential threats like non-runaway climate change and global poverty, but you are actually a morally better person for focusing instead on more important things—risk that could permanently destroy “our potential” as a species of Earth-originating intelligent life.

# 1NR

## Case

#### No AI extinction---it’s impossible and centuries away at best.

Oren Etzioni, 16 - CEO of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Professor of Computer Science at the University of Washington; "Most experts say AI isn’t as much of a threat as you might think," MIT Technology Review, 9-20-2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602410/no-the-experts-dont-think-superintelligent-ai-is-a-threat-to-humanity/

To get a more accurate assessment of the opinion of leading researchers in the field, I turned to the Fellows of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence, a group of researchers who are recognized as having made significant, sustained contributions to the field.

In early March 2016, AAAI sent out an anonymous survey on my behalf, posing the following question to 193 fellows:

“In his book, Nick Bostrom has defined Superintelligence as ‘an intellect that is much smarter than the best human brains in practically every field, including scientific creativity, general wisdom and social skills.’ When do you think we will achieve Superintelligence?”

Over the next week or so, 80 fellows responded (a 41 percent response rate), and their responses are summarized below:

In essence, according to 92.5 percent of the respondents, superintelligence is beyond the foreseeable horizon. This interpretation is also supported by written comments shared by the fellows.

Even though the survey was anonymous, 44 fellows chose to identify themselves, including Geoff Hinton (deep-learning luminary), Ed Feigenbaum (Stanford, Turing Award winner), Rodney Brooks (leading roboticist), and Peter Norvig (Google).

The respondents also shared several comments, including the following:

“Way, way, way more than 25 years. Centuries most likely. But not never.”

“We’re competing with millions of years’ evolution of the human brain. We can write single-purpose programs that can compete with humans, and sometimes excel, but the world is not neatly compartmentalized into single-problem questions.”

“Nick Bostrom is a professional scare monger. His Institute’s role is to find existential threats to humanity. He sees them everywhere. I am tempted to refer to him as the ‘Donald Trump’ of AI.”

Surveys do, of course, have limited scientific value. They are notoriously sensitive to question phrasing, selection of respondents, etc. However, it is the one source of data that Bostrom himself turned to.

Another methodology would be to extrapolate from the current state of AI to the future. However, this is difficult because we do not have a quantitative measurement of the current state of human-level intelligence. We have achieved superintelligence in board games like chess and Go (see “Google’s AI Masters Go a Decade Earlier than Expected”), and yet our programs failed to score above 60 percent on eighth grade science tests, as the Allen Institute’s research has shown (see “The Best AI Program Still Flunks an Eighth Grade Science Test”), or above 48 percent in disambiguating simple sentences (see “Tougher Turing Test Exposes Chatbots’ Stupidity”).

There are many valid concerns about AI, from its impact on jobs to its uses in autonomous weapons systems and even to the potential risk of superintelligence. However, predictions that superintelligence is on the foreseeable horizon are not supported by the available data. Moreover, doom-and-gloom predictions often fail to consider the potential benefits of AI in preventing medical errors, reducing car accidents, and more.

Finally, it’s possible that AI systems could collaborate with people to create a symbiotic superintelligence. That would be very different from the pernicious and autonomous kind envisioned by Professor Bostrom.

#### Space colonization’s expansion to the ‘new frontier’ is founded upon racist imagery and genocide---makes the Earth worse off and undermines sustainability---turns the advantage.

Haskins 18, Senior Technology Reporter at Business Insider (Caroline, August 4th, “THE RACIST LANGUAGE OF SPACE EXPLORATION,” *The Outline*, <https://theoutline.com/post/5809/the-racist-language-of-space-exploration>, Accessed 1-17-2022)

Trump is far from the first or only person to use the language of colonization to make a pro-space venture argument. Elon Musk famously describes his plans for a Martian settlement as a “colony,” and a long lineage of space pundits, politicians, and thinkers invoke the history of colonizers and colonization in order to frame the future of humanity in space. During a July 25 hearing of the Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness titled “Destination Mars – Putting American Boots on the Surface of the Red Planet,” subcommittee head, Texas Sen. Ted Cruz said that he believes that the first trillionaire on earth will make their money from space exploration.

“I don’t know who it will be, and I don’t know what they will discover, or what they will accomplish,” Cruz said. “But I think it is every bit as vast and promising a frontier as the New World was some centuries ago.”

“You could argue that the effort to colonize space is likely to involve new forms of inequality: shifts in tax revenues and administrative priorities devoted to that,” said Michael Ralph, a professor of anthropology at NYU. “As opposed to [supporting] other social institutions that benefit people like health care, education, infrastructure.”

Earning money in space is an exciting prospect for a far-right, pro-business, anti-regulation politician like Cruz, and he explicitly associated it with European countries having colonized the Americas. Starting in the late 1400s, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal funded missions to the Americas in order to gather natural resources that would power up their economies. By stealing the land that made this resource extraction possible, colonizers used genocide, enslavement, biological weaponry, and warfare and that resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of indigenous people living in the “New World.” The concept of race, and therefore racism, was invented as a way of justifying their violence and legitimizing a hierarchy of race-divided labor.

Based off of what we know right now, the Moon and Mars are devoid of life, so this colonizing language is not actually putting other beings at risk. But, there is the risk that the same racist mythology used to justify violence and inequality on earth — such as the use of frontier, “cowboy” mythology to condone and promote the murder and displacement of indigenous people in the American West — will be used to justify missions to space. In a future where humans potentially do live on non-earth planets, that same racist mythology would carry through to who is allowed to exist on, and benefit from, extraterrestrial spaces.

On Earth, and in the United States specifically, the ideal of a merit-based society has been used to justify race-blind hiring policies that fail to account for, say, the implicit bias against black or Asian-sounding names, or the legacy of segregation, which continues to make children of color more vulnerable to attending underfunded schools. Narratives of “law and order” have also been used to justify racial profiling and harsher prison sentences for people of color than for white people who commit the same crimes. Not nearly enough work has been done here on Earth to ensure that these structural inequalities wouldn’t carry through.

“Those narratives do carry specific implications about how people living on other worlds might be structured,” Lucianne Walkowicz, the current Chair of Astrobiology at the Library of Congress, told The Outline. Walkowicz organized the Decolonizing Mars Conference that took place on June 27 as well as a public follow-up event planned for September, to discuss how colonial language is shaping our potential future in space. “Space is not just built for nothing, it’s built for people.”

When we think about humanity’s potential to exist on other planets, it’s important to consider who won’t have access to space, in part due to a total lack of concern over these issues by people who are able to access it. Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos intends to make space a place for the rich to use for adventure leisure, and SpaceX/Tesla founder Elon Musk has proposed that a Martian “colony” can save a selection of humanity from the collapse of civilization in some World War III scenario. Granted, right now, these are just words from billionaires who want to excite the public about their business ventures. But they suggest that if the economically and socially vulnerable are priced out of a life-saving journey from Earth, it is a justifiable loss.

“All of these things that are said off the cuff [by billionaires] have some implications that are concrete and count some people in, and some people out,” Walkowicz said.

Part of that concern is fueled by the fact that Cruz and Pence have presented the path to settling space as one that will be privately funded, but lead by the U.S. government. In the Destination Mars subcommittee meeting, Cruz said, “At the end of the day, the commercial sector is going to be able to invest billions more in dollars in getting this job [of getting to Mars] done.” In his Thursday remarks regarding the Space Force, Pence also implied that celestial territories would be treated as private property (even though owning private property in space is explicitly illegal per the Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. and dozens of other nations signed in 1967).

“While other nations increasingly possess the capability to operate in space, not all of them share our commitment to freedom, to private property, and the rule of law,” Pence said. “So as we continue to carry American leadership in space, so also will we carry America’s commitment to freedom into this new frontier.”

This approach to public-private partnerships directly mirrors colonist practices. For instance, the British East India Company violently colonized parts of India on behalf of the company, but over time, ownership of the stolen land shifted to Great Britain.

While these risks feel a part of a far away future, in the present, idealizing colonization as a positive, replicable aspect of American history speaks to an unsettling indifference from leaders about the violent history of colonization. And by referencing historical events that victimized people of color, leaders paint a vision of the future in which people of color continue to be excluded, Walkowicz said that the social and economic legacy of colonization is ignored.

By using narratives of adventurism and heroics, white Americans were able to convince other white Americans that they were not only entitled to steal and conquest land and persons, but that it was their destiny. Ralph said to The Outline that this mythology remains central to the way Americans conceptualize their history and culture.

“Colonization is portrayed as a heroic conquest,” Ralph said. “These practices are framed as central to American identity, essential to governance, politics, and all major social institution. But not depicted as a colonizing that is one caused by violence, displacement, dispossession.”

Even when people aren’t explicitly referring to settlements in space as “colonies,” they still use the rhetoric of colonizing the New World and the American frontier, which erases the stories of and violence against the people of color who lived and ranched in the region. But how did this language start being used in the first place?

Presidents have also used frontierism and colonialism to get white citizens behind their agenda. When President John F. Kennedy announced his intention to bring Americans to the Moon in 1962, he paraphrased one of the earliest colonists on the North American continent.

“William Bradford, speaking in 1630 of the founding of the Plymouth Bay Colony, said that all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage,” Kennedy said.

Bradford was the governor of the Plymouth Bay Colony at the time of the Pequot War. In an overnight attack, British colonizers massacred four hundred soldiers, non-soldiers, and children. Bradford later described the act of genocide as a Christian victory. “...victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the prays therof to God,” Bradford wrote, “who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to inclose their enemies in their hands, and give them so speedy a victory over so proud and insulting an enemy.”

Although Kennedy did not characterize his vision for the Moon as creating a “colony” specifically, the association he wanted to create is clear: The Moon is the next version of the New World, the next frontier for American conquest.

In his speech, Kennedy continues that men like Bradford teach us that “man, in his quest for knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred.” However, if “man” is a stand-in for “white colonizers,” “knowledge and progress” unabashedly brushes over the lives of indigenous persons and people of color that were lost in their quest to “explore.” It’s a profusely sanitized version of reality.

“It’s fascinating that a term like ‘colonizing’ can be seen in neutral terms when it can’t exist without violence and dispossession,” Ralph said. It can’t exist without violence to establish a political hierarchy. Every colonial project is about managing populations, subjugating people, extracting resources.”

But Kennedy was not the first person to use of colonizing language in the context of space. John Wilkins, one of the first people who ever theorized about humanity’s future in space, wrote “A Discourse Concerning a New World and Another Planet” back in 1638, where he argued that the Moon will be a place for human habitation in the future. Although it was a piece of science fiction theorization at the time, Wilkins justified his argument by saying that God created the Earth and stars for people to use in his honor.

Colonizers are adventurers, Wilkins argues, whose ideals are worth replicating on other planets. “The invention of some other means for our convenience to the Moon cannot seem more incredible to us, than this did at first to them, to be discouraged in our hopes of the like success,” Wilkins wrote, admitting that any mission to the moon would be far in the future. “We have not now any [Sir Francis] Drake, or Columbus, to undertake this voyage, or any Daedalus to invent a convenience through the air.”

Sir Francis Drake was a slave-trader, and of course, Christopher Columbus is responsible for the genocide of almost 3 million people on the island of Hispaniola (now the Dominican Republic and Haiti).

As space travel has become more technologically feasible, science-fiction writers have speculated about how a space society would actually function. Arthur C. Clarke envisioned that “colonial” would be a dirty word in space in his 1954 book Earthflight: “And to do [enter Solar politics], one had to go to Earth; as in the days of the Caesars, there was no alternative. Those who believed otherwise or pretended to — risked being tagged with the dreaded word “colonial.’”

For Clarke, colonialism was equated with privilege in a space society, not because of racism and violence on Earth. Later in the novel, Clarke doesn’t hesitate to compare travelling between planets, and the nobility of doing so, with British colonizers travelling between continents in earlier centuries.

Adilifu Nama, a professor of African American Studies at Loyola Marymount University who has written about the representation of race in science fiction, said that science fiction movies and books during the 1950s and 1960s often included narratives of invasion from alien lifeforms directly alongside conceptualizations of existing in other worlds. These anxious science fiction narratives became popular during the Civil Rights Movement.

“We had [an] invasion emerging [during the Civil Rights Movement] of black folks invading these once pristine white spaces: with public transportation, public schools, and eventually particular neighbourhoods and black folks having access to better, more upscale neighbourhoods,” Nama said. “So there is also this invasion society around racial purity, and the tensions of science fiction can be read not only as Cold War anxieties, but racial anxieties about the other.”

Ralph said to The Outline that the Space Race of the 1950s and 60s shouldn’t be seen as purely a nationalist competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union: it was also a distraction from the Civil Rights Movement.

“A lot of what we think of as the Space Race was the US and Russia competing as rivals for supremacy in space back in the 1950s, but also that movement was about civil rights and the struggle for justice for Americans,” Ralph said. “In a way, you could argue that space exploration has historically been used to shift public attention away from the struggle of social justice.”

According to Walkowicz, that people dip into the violent, racist history of colonialism and gloss over their language using a sense of adventure provided by the American frontier is no coincidence. “The people for whom the American frontier myth were constructed, who were primarily white men, also now have the narrative of space,“ Walkowicz said. “And because tech is so incredibly non-diverse, and has been so slow to change even in those small ways in which it has, I think a lot of those narratives go unquestioned.”

The people with the power to make a future in space possible, such as Trump, Pence, and Cruz, or the money to actually get us there, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, are the same people who have and will always benefit from systemic racism and the potential economic glory from new economic ventures.

Ralph noted that prioritizing space travel undermines funding for sustainable forms of energy like wind and solar, and efficient ways to construct affordable houses and schools. It also has direct economic implications for the people who rely on any number of federally-funded social programs in the U.S.

## T

#### Any meaningful antitrust discussions requires distinguishing between the two

FTC 6 (Consumer Benefits and Harms: How Best to Distinguish Aggressive, Pro-Consumer Competition From Business Conduct To Attain or Maintain a Monopoly, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/04/07/06-3366/consumer-benefits-and-harms-how-best-to-distinguish-aggressive-pro-consumer-competition-from)

An appropriate antitrust approach, therefore, requires means for distinguishing permissible from impermissible conduct in varied circumstances. Moreover, those means should provide reasonable guidance to businesses attempting to evaluate the legality of proposed conduct before undertaking it. The development of clear standards that work to the advantage of consumers while enabling businesses to comply with the antitrust laws presents some of the most complex issues facing the FTC, the DOJ, the courts, and the antitrust bar. Commentators actively debate the character of conduct that implicates section 2, and the utility of different tests for distinguishing anticompetitive and procompetitive business practices.

Try or die for limits---our distinction being arbitrary doesn’t matter if we make a more productive topic

#### This doesn’t even say nationalization is antitrust policy (KU YELLOW)

**Hewitt 21** [Liane Hewitt, historian of political economy and international order at Princeton, Economic History Workshop is a monthly seminar series for Princeton students and faculty interested in the study of economic history, co-sponsored by the Department of History at Princeton and the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance, the workshop provides a forum for scholars to present their findings and receive feedback on their research in a wide array of subfields, such as financial, business, labor, legal, intellectual, technological, and social history, Nationalization as Anti-Trust Policy: The Post-War Anti-Fascist Moment in France, Britain and West-Germany, 1944-51,” Feb 4, 2021, https://jrc.princeton.edu/events/hewitt-spring-2021]

This dissertation asks how international cartels became rejected after the Second World as the private scaffolding for organizing European capitalism and international order. After 1918, a broad consensus of actors (governments, politicians, legal and economic experts, and sectors of socialists, labor and consumer groups) boosted cartels as a near-panacea for stabilizing chaotic markets, securing the fragile peace, and building a common market that could hold its own against American Fordist mass-production and distribution. This chapter argues that the sweeping nationalization reforms enacted at the end of WW2 by Britain and France, under the Attlee Labour government and the Resistance-controlled Constituent Assembly respectively, should be seen as pivotal episodes in Western Europe’s anti-cartel turn. This interpretation brings together two traditionally separate historiographies: the first on the post-war social-democratic moment and the construction of national welfare states, and the second more technical literature on post-1945 de-cartelization. The chapter suggests that governments and activists justified nationalization as an anti-trust policy to defeat the anti-democratic, perhaps even fascistic power of private big-business over the state and national economic life. The organized Left had proposed comprehensive nationalization reforms since the end of WW1. But it was not until the anti-fascist and Liberation moment swept Britain and France in the wake of the victory of 1944-45 that governments took control of the commanding heights of their economies: notably credit, energy (gas, coal), transport, and iron and steel (in Britain, only). The chapter will conclude by briefly considering alternative national solutions to the cartel problem after 1945, which did not involve state nationalizations in Scandinavia and West Germany. American occupation and a weaker post-war anti-fascist moment in these countries may hold the key to explaining why they did not take the nationalization-as-antitrust policy route.

#### It’s been justified on a variety of other grounds

Majone 10 (Giandomenico Majone-Italian scholar of political science whose expertise is regulatory governance within the European Union (EU) as well as theories of delegation and their effect on the perceived democratic deficit of the EU. He is an Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. “G. The transformation of the regulatory State”, Osservatorio sull’Analisi di Impatto della Regolazione, www.osservatorioair.it, settembre 2010, <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.688.6697&rep=rep1&type=pdf> , date accessed 10/3/21)

However, it is important to realize that the nationalization of key industries has been justified on a variety of grounds: not only to eliminate the political power and alleged economic inefficiency of private monopolies, but also to stimulate economic development, favor particular regions or social groups, foster “industrial democracy”, or ensure national security. This multiplicity of objectives reduced accountability to vanishing point, but in the short run it greatly facilitated the formation of supporting coalitions. Regardless of the multiplicity of objectives and ideological justifications, the central assumption was always that public ownership would increase government’s ability to regulate the economy and protect the public interest. Public enterprises would shape economic structure directly through their production decisions and indirectly through their pricing decisions. In the early days of nationalization it seemed axiomatic that the imposition of price and quality standards in the public interest could be achieved more effectively by the flexible decisionmaking inherent in the public ownership framework — considerable managerial discretion subject only, in theory, to political accountability — than by formalized legal controls imposed by an external agency, and subject to judicial review.

#### Antitrust is distinct from nationalization—even if both are skeptical of trusts

DiLorenzo 85 (THOMAS J. DILORENZO-Department of Economics, George Mason University. “THE ORIGINS OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEREST-GROUP PERSPECTIVE” , International Review of Law and Economics (1985), 5 (73-90), date accessed 10/2/21)

There was some opposition to these views but Gordon, in his survey, found them to be a very small minority. So universal was the favorable attitude toward the trusts by economists that antitrust laws were opposed by even the harshest critics of laissez faire. Perhaps the most prominent critic of the private enterprise system was Richard T. Ely, who in 1885 organized the American Economic Association. Ely did not share the evolutionary view of the market held by most others in the profession at that time and favored much greater government intervention into economic affairs. In the 'first principle' upon which he thought an American Economic Association should be based he stated:

We regard the state as an educational and ethical agency whose positive aid is an indispensable condition of human progress. While we recognize the necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we hold that the doctrine of laissez-faire is unsafe in politics and unsound in morals; and that it suggests an inadequate explanation of the relations between the state and the citizens.49

Having developed this perspective Ely was highly critical of the trusts but not because he thought they were monopolies. Rather, he believed they 'exploited' the working class and recommended two policy approaches to the 'trust problem'. One was the nationalization of certain industries. Government ownership, thought Ely, would allow them to be run on a more 'morally sound' basis. The second approach involved governmental regulation in the form of the abolition of child labor, restrictions on working hours for women, government inspection of factories, and limits on the number of hours worked per day. Ely hoped these measures would' ... do more to moralize industry and purify politics than all the restrictive legislation against capital [i.e., an antitrust law] ever enacted' .50 Thus, even though Ely was perhaps the harshest critic of the trusts in particular and of laissez-faire in general (at least among US economists) he still did not advocate antitrust legislation. Instead, he favored the nationalization of industry and the regulation of labor relations.

#### They’re two extremes

Delbono and Lamertini 16 (Flavio Delbono-Department of Economics, University of Bologna. Luca Lambertini-Department of Economics, University of Bologna. “Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion” , J Ind Compet Trade (2016) 16:127–136, accessed online via KU Libaries, date accessed 10/3/21)

The view that the public firm is one of the instruments to correct market failures and to improve social welfare is well established.1 The presence of market failures like those associated to imperfect or distorted competition may clearly motivate some form of public intervention as, for instance, the creation of a mixed oligopoly. This outcome may be achieved by the policy maker either by creating a new (publicly owned)2 company or by nationalising a private one. The market structure emerging from such operation can then be viewed as intermediate between the extreme situations of “complete government ownership and control, and private ownership restricted by close government supervision in the form of regulation and anti-trust laws” (Merrill and Schneider 1966, p. 400).

#### And are competing policies

Cohen 91 (JEFFREY E. COHEN. "The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876–1917." *Journal of Policy History* 3.1 (1991): 42-69. Date accessed 10/3/21)

From 1914 until 1933, the foundations of federally regulated monopoly were set. AT & T's competitive position remained strong, verging on dominant, but government policies were in flux as advocates of antitrust, regulation, and nationalization began to compete for direction of government policy. The regulators won, but AT & T's relationship with the government would be plagued throughout the rest of its history as the antitrust proponents periodically challenged the company. AT & T was satisfied with its market position and sought a stable government regime to protect that position. By the end of the period, AT&T also was satisfied that its strategy toward the government had been successful.

#### Nationalization isn’t even regulation

Crane 14 (Daniel A. Crane-Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. "All I Really Need to Know about Antitrust I Learned in 1912," Iowa Law Review 100, no. 5 (July 2015): 2025-2038. Hein accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 10/2/21)

A striking and often misunderstood fact about the 1912 election is that, although all four major candidates generally agreed that something needed to be done about the trusts, only two of them-the conservative Taft and the progressive Wilson-thought that anything like antitrust law, as we currently think of it, was the solution. The two other candidates-Roosevelt and Debs-favored either regulation taking the place of antitrust or complete nationalization of industry. Thus, the question in 1912 was not merely what kind of antitrust law to have, but whether a competitive economy should exist at all.

#### It’s the “none of the above” option in the antitrust vs regs debate

Wu 17 (Tim Wu- Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor at Columbia Law School. The author was previously an advisor to the National Economic Council in the Executive Office of the President, "Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts." Colorado Technology Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2017, p. 33-64. HeinOnline, date accessed 10/2/21)

For most of the 20th century, the antitrust paradigm and the public-utility paradigm were the mainstays of economic regulation in the United States. 15 (A third approach, nationalization, was never particularly popular in the United States, despite a few experiments, like the brief nationalization of AT&T). 16 The antitrust paradigm presupposed markets that were capable of competition, but were also vulnerable to cartelization or monopolization.17 Antitrust enforcement pursued by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was prosecutorial, case driven, and inescapably motivated by some concept of wrongful conduct causing harm. It existed in contrast to the public-utility paradigm, which in its original form presupposed an industry that could not reasonably be left entirely to its own devices, for one reason or another.18 The origins of public utilities lay in the common law concept that some businesses were "public callings," or, in the phrase used by Lord Hale, "affected with a publick interest." 19 As the Supreme Court put it:

Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. 20